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 In this dissertation, I defend two theses: first, that experiences with spatial 
phenomenology represent space as single and unitary, and, second, that every experience 
has a spatial phenomenology. The two theses entail the conclusion that the unity of 
conscious spatial representation is necessary for the unity of consciousness. This means 
that unified consciousness has a (partially) spatial structure. In what follows, I adopt the 
mereological conception of unified consciousness according to which experiences are 
unified just in case they are parts of a subject’s total phenomenal state. I also assume that 
the unity relation is a relation among experiences. 
Most philosophers working on the unity of consciousness reject the conclusion that 
unity of consciousness requires the unity of spatial representation. But in my dissertation I 
show that there are compelling reasons to accept the two theses that jointly entail it. First, 
I argue that all spatial perceptual representations represent space as single and unitary. 
Then, I argue that non-perceptual spatial experiences: imagination experiences, 
recollective experiences, as well as experiences of afterimages and phosphenes have the 
kind of spatial content that relates the locations represented in these experiences to the 
locations represented in perception. In short, the locations represented in perceptual and 
non-perceptual experiences are represented as belonging to the same space.  
Secondly, I argue that experiences standardly taken not to possess spatial 
phenomenology, such as conscious thoughts and moods, either do in fact possess such 
phenomenology (thoughts), or wholly depend for their own phenomenology on spatially 
unified experiences (moods).  
When it comes to conscious thoughts, I argue that the view that they exhibit spatial 
phenomenology is dialectically privileged over its denial. This means that granting spatial 
phenomenology to conscious thoughts is a more reasonable default starting position. 
Considerations marshalled from the philosophical accounts concerning what it’s like to 
have conscious thoughts, as well as those marshalled from the literature on the pathologies 
of cognitive experience (especially schizophrenia) strongly suggest that what it’s like to 
have thoughts does involve awareness of the thoughts’ locations (typically in one’s head). 
When it comes to mood experiences, I argue that all it takes to account for the 
phenomenal character of such experiences are modifications to other, non-mood 
experiences. Such modifications are not, however, free-standing experiences for which the 
question of unity arises. This is because the unity relation is a relation between experiences, 
not between non-detachable aspects of a single, free-standing experience. Hence, the view 
that for the mood experience to obtain, other experiences must simply be modified in 
certain ways is compatible with the view that spatial unity is necessary for phenomenal 
unity. This is because the relation between an experience and its modification is not the 
phenomenal unity relation. The way mood experiences are unified with other experiences 
is wholly captured by the way in which a modification of an experience is unified with that 
experience. And this is not a phenomenal unity relation. On the other hand, the experiences 
that collectively give rise to the mood experience are spatially and phenomenally unified. 
Hence, mood experiences do not pose a special problem for my account. 
I conclude that unified consciousness requires unified conscious spatial 
representation. Consciousness has a spatial structure. 
Moim Rodzicom, Lidii i Janowi. 
And to Anna. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
As you’re giving a lecture on the mind-body problem, you see row after row of 
captivated listeners, you hear and understand your own voice, you’re wondering to what 
extent your exposition is clear, you feel the pressure the soles of your feet exert on the 
ground as you realize that the temperature in the classroom could be raised a degree or two. 
You’re a bit overexcited, as you’ve just had your third coffee this morning, and it has left 
a slight aftertaste in your mouth. You sense a headache coming, and you’re a little hungry. 
There’s not only something it is like to have each of these experiences individually. 
Your experience of the hunger and your experience of your own voice are connected in 
ways that your experience of the hunger and your listeners’ experience of your voice are 
not. There is nothing it is like for your listeners’ experience and your own experience to be 
had together. There is no “bigger” experience these individual experiences are parts of. But 
there is something it is like for you to have your experiences together. There’s something 
it is like to be you at that moment. All the conscious states had together by you are parts of 
your overall stream of consciousness. They are unified. That unity (i.e. the phenomenal 
unity of consciousness) is the topic of this dissertation. 
Let us say that unified consciousness consists of a number of phenomenally conscious 
states, connected by some relation in virtue of which they have conjoint phenomenology. 
Let us call this relation the phenomenal unity relation. The phenomenal unity relation 
accounts for the phenomenal difference between there being a special phenomenal 
character to my hearing x and seeing y simultaneously, and there being no such 
phenomenal character to my hearing x and your seeing y simultaneously. This is because 
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my auditory experience and my visual experience stand in the phenomenal unity relation, 
while my auditory experience and your visual experience don’t. Simply put, for my 
conscious states to be unified is for there to be something it is like to experience them 
together. But could more be said about phenomenal unity? Could an account of 
phenomenal unity be given? 
Let’s say that unified consciousness is structured just in case an account of the 
phenomenal unity relation in more basic terms can be given. More precisely, phenomenal 
consciousness is structured just in case necessary and sufficient conditions for conscious 
experiences to be phenomenally unified can be found.  
What are the more basic terms in which the phenomenal unity relation can be accounted 
for? Here’s my proposal: in addition to being phenomenally unified, a subject’s conscious 
states might stand in a number of “coherence relations.” Coherence here is understood very 
broadly: it refers to some kind of integration among either conscious experiences 
themselves, or the contents of these experiences, along a parameter or a range of 
parameters. Coherence relations are the more basic terms in which to account for 
phenomenal unity. 
Now, one answer to the question about the structure of consciousness is, obviously yes. 
Unified consciousness is very often structured in various ways. For instance, all your 
conscious states right now might happen to have mutually consistent contents. Or, they 
may all happen to be realized in some single part of the brain. Yet, saying this doesn’t seem 
to give us any insight into the essence of conscious unity. A philosophically more 
interesting question in the vicinity seems to be whether any kind of structure is necessary 
and/or sufficient for phenomenal unity.  
 
3 
 
One answer to this question is that unified consciousness does not have any necessary 
structure, because phenomenal unity is a primitive relation. This seems to me to be Barry 
Dainton’s (2000) view. 
Those who do not take Dainton’s route can explain the unity relation in two different 
ways: either by appealing to the relations between the contents of the unified experiences, 
or by appealing to relations between the experiences themselves.  
Tim Bayne (2010) offers a prominent account of phenomenal unity of the latter sort. 
According to Bayne, consciousness has a mereological structure: two experiences are 
phenomenally unified just in case they are parts of the subject’s total phenomenal 
experience. Bayne explains this view by, first, endorsing what he calls “the Unity Thesis: 
Necessarily, for any conscious subject of experience (S) and any time (t), the simultaneous 
conscious states that S has at t will be subsumed by a single conscious state—the subject's 
total conscious state.” Second, he accounts for the relation of being subsumed by in terms 
of the relation of being a part of. This account grants unified consciousness more structure 
than Dainton’s—it endows consciousness with a part-whole structure—but Bayne doesn’t 
seem to think that unified consciousness necessarily displays any more structure than this. 
In particular, it is not necessary that there be any ordering among the subsumed 
experiences. We might call the kind of structure granted to consciousness by Bayne’s 
theory, a thin structure. 
The views proposed by Sebastian Watzl (2014), Luke Roelofs (2014), and Elijah 
Chudnoff (2013) endow unified consciousness with a “thicker” structure than Bayne’s 
view. On these views, unified consciousness is structured into a center and a periphery (i.e. 
into some sort of a phenomenal field). According to these theorists, unified experiences, in 
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addition being parts of the total phenomenal state, also exhibit some extra ordering, in 
terms of which some conscious states end up in the center, and others end up in the 
periphery of unified consciousness. Like Bayne’s view, however, these views also do not 
recruit the contents of the partial states to do any essential work in explaining the structure 
of unified consciousness. 
Michael Tye’s (2003) is a content-based mirror image of Bayne’s view, as far as the 
structure of consciousness is concerned. For Tye, a subject has a unified consciousness just 
in case the subject has a single, total phenomenal experience with multiple, multimodal 
contents. Again, though, no further ordering amid the contents of experience seems 
necessary on Tye’s account. Susan Hurley (1998) offers a similar content-based account 
of unified consciousness. 
A content-based account that grants consciousness more structure than Hurley’s and 
Tye’s views is Sydney Shoemaker’s (1996) view. According to Shoemaker, “unity of 
consciousness is in part a matter of one's various beliefs forming, collectively, a unified 
conception of the world.” This account of unity demands more from the contents of unified 
consciousness than merely being conscious contents entertained simultaneously. Some 
amount of representational coherence (though what exactly this is is hard to explicate) is 
also required of the individual contents. In particular, some contents might be more central 
to the picture of the world than others. (In fact, Hurley’s view could be placed between 
Tye’s and Shoemaker’s, because Hurley also requires that the contents of unified states be 
subject to some objective norms of coherence; Tye doesn’t appear to require that). 
Yet another content-based view is proposed by Farid Masrour (2014). On Masrour’s 
view, phenomenal unity is not explicable in terms of any single relation among the contents 
 
5 
 
of phenomenal states, but rather in terms of many relations that we may be aware of in our 
experience: causal relations, spatial relations, rational relations, and so on. The structure of 
consciousness on Masrour’s view is heterogeneous. 
In developing their own accounts, many theorists of phenomenal unity (Dainton (2000), 
Bayne & Chalmers (2003), Bayne (2004, 2010), Tye (2003), Watzl (2014), and Roelofs 
(2014)) consider yet another way in which the phenomenal unity relation can be explained 
by a content-based view. They all reflect on, and reject, the view according to which spatial 
content might hold the key to a structural account of phenomenal unity. The view in 
question is that phenomenal unity might be explained in terms of spatial unity of 
experience. 
Bayne and Chalmers offer a helpful (though, as will emerge in Chapter 2, too narrow) 
characterization of spatial phenomenal unity: “a set of experiences are spatially unified if 
(i) each has spatial representational content, and (ii) the representational content of each is 
comparable, in the sense that the objects represented are represented as being in spatial 
relations to each other [italics in original].” Accounting for phenomenal unity in terms of 
spatial unity has several virtues: (1) it allows us to make sense of the typically perspectival 
nature of unified consciousness (because spatial representation is perspectival); (2) it 
allows us to capture an aspect of unified consciousness as a picture of a unified world that 
Shoemaker speaks about, without overintellectualizing unified consciousness (spatial 
representation is plausibly available for lower animals and infants; building up a 
conception of the world, not so much); (3) it allows us to understand phenomenal unity in 
terms of representations whose neuro-functional profiles are relatively well-understood; 
(4) it captures an intuitively appealing naïve introspective judgment; after all, it just seems 
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that my experiences represent to me a spatially unified world. If explaining phenomenal 
unity in terms of spatial unity is so great, whence the resistance? 
There are two main objections to the idea that phenomenal unity can be explained in 
terms of spatial unity, denying either condition (i) or (ii) in Bayne and Chalmers’s 
definition. On the one hand, some conscious states seem to lack spatial representational 
content (e.g. conscious thoughts), or even lack representational content altogether (e.g. 
moods). On the other hand, actual subjects of experience may enjoy phenomenally unified 
spatial experiences that are not comparable (e.g. imagining space and perceiving space at 
the same time); plus, there are possible subjects of experience who could simultaneously 
perceive different locations that are not comparable, in virtue of having their sensory 
organs receiving input from spatially distant places at the same time. 
I propose that all these objections can be resisted. Hence, in this dissertation, I argue 
for the view that spatial unity of consciousness is necessary for the phenomenal unity of 
consciousness. I deal with these objections in the reverse order to the one they were just 
presented. I start with possible and actual putative spatial disunity, and then talk about 
putative lack of spatiality. 
I base my thesis on two premises: 
(1) Every experience is a spatial experience (or wholly depends on spatial 
experiences). 
(2) All of the subject’s phenomenally unified spatial experiences are experiences as 
of the same, single, unitary space. 
(3) So, all of the subject’s phenomenally unified experiences are experiences as of a 
single unitary space. 
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I support premise (1) mainly by considerations contained in Chapters 4 and 5, where I 
talk about experiences that may initially seem to fail to exhibit any spatiality: conscious 
thoughts and mood experiences, respectively. Some reasons to think that sensory 
experiences (including olfactory experiences and auditory experiences) and bodily 
experiences have spatial phenomenology are scattered throughout Chapters 2 and 4. A 
more sustained discussion of visual, and yet arguably non-spatial, experiences undergone 
by a patient suffering from Balint’s syndrome is contained in Chapter 3. In general, though, 
I focus on conscious thoughts and moods. This is because it is not phenomenologically 
apparent that these sorts of experiences exhibit any spatiality at all. On the other hand, 
auditory, olfactory, and gustatory experiences seem to the introspective eye to be at least 
prima facie spatial.  
Here is a slightly more rigorous presentation of considerations supporting premise (1): 
(4) Cognitive phenomenology has a spatial aspect (Chapter 3). 
(5) Sensory phenomenology and bodily phenomenology have a spatial aspect 
(Chapters 2-4). 
(6) Mood phenomenology is wholly dependent on affective modifications to sensory 
and cognitive experiences, hence on spatial experiences (Chapter 5). 
(7) So, every experience is a spatial experience, or wholly depends on spatial 
experiences (=Premise 1). 
I support premise (2) by considerations contained primarily in Chapter 2, where I 
motivate the principle that all of the subject’s perceptual experiences represent a single, 
unitary space. I then devote a section of Chapters 4 and 5 to show how non-perceptual 
experiences that are the focus of these chapters are spatially unified with perceptual 
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experiences. Chapter 3, in turn, argues that quasi-perceptual experiences and some atypical 
perceptual experiences are also spatially unified with perceptual experiences.  
Here is a slightly more rigorous presentation of considerations supporting premise (2): 
(8) All phenomenally unified perceptual experiences of a subject are experiences as 
of the same, single, unitary space (Chapter 2). 
(9) Imagination experiences, memory experiences and phosphene/afterimage 
experiences of a subject are spatially unified with the subject’s perceptual 
experiences (Chapter 3).  
(10) A subject’s experiences of the character that patients with Balint’s syndrome have 
are spatially unified with the subject’s other experiences (Chapter 3). 
(11) A subject’s cognitive experiences are spatially unified with the subject’s 
perceptual experiences (Chapter 4). 
(12) A subject’s mood experiences are wholly dependent on the subject’s spatially 
unified experiences (Chapter 5). 
(13) So, all of a subject’s spatial experiences are experiences as of the same, single, 
unitary space (=Premise 2). 
It follows that there cannot be phenomenally unified experiences that aren’t also 
spatially unified. Spatial unity is necessary for phenomenal unity. 
I also take it that spatial unity is obviously sufficient for phenomenal unity: to 
experience any two objects or locations as belonging to the same space, I have to 
experience them together. This explains why the objections raised to explaining 
phenomenal unity in terms of spatial unity focus on the necessity component of the account. 
 
  
Chapter 2: Unity of Consciousness and the Experience of Space 
2.1 Spatial Unity and Perceptual Experience 
In this chapter I argue that there is a deep connection between the unity of perceptual-
somatic consciousness and the experience of space. In particular, I argue that for one’s 
perceptual-somatic consciousness to be unified, one’s conscious states have to represent a 
spatially unified environment. I consider a popular objection to this line of thought, 
according to which it’s possible to have a unified consciousness while simultaneously 
experiencing spatially disconnected environments. In responding to this argument, I 
develop an account of spatial experience, and the experience of spatial connectedness that 
entails the necessity of the latter for phenomenal unity. 
There are several questions that can be raised with regards to phenomenal unity of 
consciousness: phenomenological questions (what is unified consciousness like from the 
inside?), structural questions (what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
consciousness to be unified?), and explanatory questions (in virtue of what is consciousness 
unified?), among others (the distinctions and connections between these questions are 
explored in more detail in (Masrour, 2014), and the seminal paper by Tim Bayne and David 
Chalmers (2003). While these questions are obviously distinct, one might find it tempting 
to treat them as interdependent, so that the answer to one constrains or informs answers to 
the others. 
One way to connect the issues raised by some of the above questions would be to say 
this: having a unified consciousness feels a lot like experiencing a spatially connected 
world from a point of view. This (answering the phenomenological question), in turn, 
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suggests a way to pursue the remaining questions; that is, it suggests exploring the relation 
between spatial experience and phenomenal unity. For starters, take Michael Tye’s 
description of what it’s like to have a unified conscious experience:  
At the current time, sitting on a patio by a swimming pool with my computer while 
sipping some tea, I have a single perceptual experience with a rich and multimodal 
phenomenology. My experience represents to me visual, auditory, olfactory, 
gustatory, and tactual features in relation to myself. I experience the red flowers to 
the left of here, the diamond shape of the tiles on the patio relative to me and my 
viewing position, the sounds of a bird straight ahead, the smell of the chlorine from 
the pool off to my right, the smoothness of the computer keys against my fingers, 
the taste of the tea as it comes into contact with my tongue. The world, as I 
perceptually experience it, thus, is a world in relationship to here (Tye, 2003) 
Tye’s description captures a pervasive feature of our perceptual engagement with the 
world. Our experience is suffused with (egocentric) spatial content, i.e. with how things 
seem to us from here. Moreover, all those “features” mentioned by Tye seem to occupy the 
same, single space. It is thus tempting to wonder if having experiences that represent 
worldly happenings as occurring in a single space (i.e. having your experience exhibit 
spatial unity) might be a good candidate for being the necessary and/or sufficient condition 
for phenomenal unity. It seems clear from introspective evidence that they go together in 
many ordinary situations. Do they have to?  
While this line of thought is initially tempting (at least as far as the necessity claim is 
concerned), most philosophers who have considered it ultimately wish to reject it (Bayne, 
2010; Bayne & Chalmers, 2003; Dainton, 2000; Roelofs, 2014; Watzl, 2014). One reason 
to do so presents itself already when addressing the phenomenological question: some 
conscious states (e.g., conscious thoughts) seem to lack any spatial phenomenology. There 
are reasons to be skeptical of such an outright rejection and I explore them in Chapters 4 
and 5. In this chapter I address a different kind of argument to the effect that spatial unity 
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is not necessary for phenomenal unity. That is, the context here is the answer to the 
structural question, and not the phenomenological question. Even if someone is persuaded, 
however, that spatial phenomenology is absent from some kinds of conscious states, one 
could take what follows as disputing the more restricted claim that spatial unity is not 
necessary for the unity of perceptual consciousness. 
In the next section I discuss a thought experiment that is supposed to undermine the 
necessary connection between spatial unity and phenomenal unity. I then examine a 
number of ways to motivate the judgment that spatial unity breaks down in the situation 
described by the thought experiment. I then criticize each motivation as insufficient to 
justify the disunity judgment. 
2.2 The Spatiality Thesis and Bayne’s Objection 
In this and the following sections, I examine and criticize an objection to the following 
way of answering the structural question: consciousness is phenomenally unified just in 
case it is spatially unified. The objection I will mostly focus on is Bayne’s (2010) “Borgy” 
thought experiment. The thought experiment may be understood as a challenge to the claim 
that spatial unity is necessary for phenomenal unity (I will call this claim the “spatiality 
thesis”). This way of reading the thought experiment has been noted in recent writings on 
the unity of consciousness by Watzl (2014) and Roelofs (2014). Interestingly, Bayne 
doesn’t take the spatiality thesis to be his main target. Watzl and Roelofs, on the other 
hand, take Bayne’s example to have shown the falsity of the spatiality thesis. But it seems 
to me that Bayne’s thought experiment does not go as far as Watzl and Roelofs need it to 
go in order to cast serious doubt on the spatiality thesis. As a result, the main purpose of 
this paper is to block a popular line of thought in theorizing about unity of consciousness, 
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according to which Bayne’s thought experiment is sufficient to establish the falsity of the 
spatiality thesis. While doing so, I sketch a (hopefully) plausible account of spatial unity 
and spatial experience that entails the spatiality thesis.  
As a side note, it’s worth mentioning that Bayne’s thought experiment is a variation on 
a theme pursued by Tye and Dainton (cf. his (2000). The latter two philosophers have 
constructed cases where a single subject’s sense organs become spatially separated (vision 
in one place, bodily sensations and proprioception in another), so that the subject 
consciously represents different spaces at the same time. I focus on Bayne’s variant as it 
sidesteps (as Bayne himself notes) issues concerning the potentially necessary connection 
between somatic experience and sensory experience that Dainton’s and Tye’s thought 
experiments might run afoul of. I think, however, that the points I raise about Bayne’s take 
on the thought experiment apply equally to Tye’s and Dainton’s versions. 
2.2.1 “Borgy” 
Here’s Bayne’s thought experiment:  
Consider an organism who I shall call ‘Borgy’. Borgy is a ‘scattered creature’, for 
he has three bodies that are biologically independent of each other. (We might think 
of each of these bodies on the model of the human body.) However, the brains that 
are located in these three bodies can communicate with each other via miniature 
radio transmitters. In fact, Borgy's brains are functionally integrated with each other 
to roughly the same degree that our two neural hemispheres are. Although Borgy 
has three bodies, he is a single subject of thought, action, and experience. His 
perceptual states feed into a unitary cognitive system, and he has direct control over 
each of his three bodies (this, in part, is what makes the three bodies his bodies) … 
The fact that he has three bodies allows Borgy to experience the world from the 
perspective of three non-contiguous locations at once. At one and the same time he 
might feel the sun beat down in Sydney, hear a plane flying over the Sonoran desert, 
and smell freshly baked croissants on the steps of Sacré Coeur. Although Borgy's 
bodily and perceptual experiences will be structured around distinct bodies, I 
suggest that they might well be phenomenally unified. Borgy's three brains are 
distributed between his three bodies, but I see no reason to deny that they might 
jointly implement the kind of neurophysiological singularity that underlies the unity 
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of consciousness. This ‘sub-personal’ integration might also have a ‘personal’ echo. 
Because Borgy's perceptual experiences feed into a single cognitive system, he will 
be able to experience certain relations between events that occur within his 
individual perceptual fields. Even though he doesn't experience the spatial relations 
between his three bodies, his phenomenal perspective could include a 
representation of (say) the relationship between the temperature in each of the 
locations in which he has a body … To take another example, suppose that there is 
a duck in front of each of Borgy's three bodies. Borgy will not experience the three 
ducks as spatially related to each other, but he may be able to experience one of 
the ducks as bigger … than the others. The upshot of these considerations, I suggest, 
is that Borgy constitutes a counterexample to the embodiment constraint, for it is 
plausible to suppose that he could retain a phenomenally unified consciousness 
despite the fact that neither his perceptual experiences nor his bodily sensations will 
be structured around a single physical object. [my emphases] (2010) 
Bayne’s aim, as can be seen from the above quotation, is to cast doubt on what he calls 
“the embodiment constraint.” The embodiment constraint says that for one to have a 
phenomenally unified conscious experience, one’s perceptions and bodily sensations need 
to be structured around a single body. Borgy has a phenomenally unified experience 
without it being structured around a single body (or so it seems); so, the embodiment 
constraint is false. I take no issue with this line of thought in what follows. But Watzl and 
Roelofs take the Borgy thought experiment to prove more than the inadequacy of the 
embodiment constraint. They take it to show that the spatiality thesis is false. Here’s one 
way to see how the above thought experiment serves to motivate the denial of the spatiality 
thesis: 
(1) Borgy’s experience is phenomenally unified.  
(2) Borgy’s experience is spatially disunified.  
(3) If Borgy’s experience is phenomenally unified and spatially disunified, then spatial 
unity is not necessary for phenomenal unity. 
(4) So, spatial unity is not necessary for phenomenal unity. 
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Premise 3 above is incontestable. Bayne replies convincingly to worries concerning 
premise 1. This leaves the proponents of the spatiality thesis with premise 2 to object to. 
In the remainder of this paper, I try to show that premise 2 is mistaken. 
As it stands, premise 2 is supported by brute, untutored intuition. At first sight, it seems 
obvious that Borgy’s experience represents disconnected regions of space. It’s not clear to 
me, however, given what’s at stake (i.e. showing that an intuitively attractive starting point 
for a theory of unified consciousness is wrong), that we should be satisfied with mere 
intuition. 
2.3 Motivations for the Disunity Judgment  
In this section, I will examine a number of more theoretically robust motivations for 
premise 2. I will ask: “Under what conditions are we entitled to say that spatial unity breaks 
down?” Answering this question will give us a way of getting clearer about the kinds of 
considerations relevant to assessing the level of threat Borgy poses for the spatiality thesis 
than what reliance on mere intuition would get us. 
Obviously, one wouldn’t get far in this enterprise, were one to leave the notion of 
spatial unity without explication. A general idea would be this: any two of the subject’s 
conscious perceptual states S1 and S2 are spatially unified just in case (a) S1 and S2 both 
have some spatial representational content, and (b) S1’s and S2’s spatial representational 
content is such that the regions represented by S1 and S2 are experienced as parts 
of/belonging to the same space. 
To have spatial representational content is to represent an object, event, or a place as 
being/occurring somewhere. I leave the notion of experiencing two regions or objects as 
belonging to the same space at an intuitive level. One clear example of such an experience, 
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however, would be an experience of two objects (or regions) as standing in some spatial 
relations, such as left-right or front-back, to one another.  
Now that our basic terms are defined, I will present three ways of motivating premise 
2. I dub them as follows:  
(a) Failure to Meet the Embodiment Constraint: one route to motivate premise 2 would 
be to say that Borgy doesn’t experience his environment as centered around one 
spatially continuous object and, as a result, his experience is spatially disunified. 
(b) No Single Egocentric Frame: another way to motivate the spatial disunity claim is 
to say that the spatial content of Borgy’s experiences cannot be structured by a 
single egocentric frame of reference. That is, there is no one frame of reference that 
may be used to specify all of the spatial content of Borgy’s experiences. 
(c) No Spatial Relations: yet another is to say that Borgy represents no spatial relations 
between objects represented in different streams.  
I think that none of the motivations presented above suffices for the acceptance of 
premise 2. In the following sections, I outline my reasons for rejecting each. 
2.3.1 Frames of Reference 
The discussion of some of the abovementioned ways in which one can motivate the 
thought that Borgy’s experience is spatially disunified will rely on the idea of frames of 
reference structuring experience in various ways. We need to spend some time on 
unpacking the notion of the frame of reference, and what it is for it to structure experience. 
There are at least two ways of thinking about frames of reference, depending on how 
robustly one understands that notion. On the one hand, we might think that frames of 
reference essentially consist of the origin of the frame and the spatial relations objects and 
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places in a scene are represented as standing to the frame’s origin and to one another. In 
this vein, Joel Smith writes that “a frame of reference is an origin and set of axes that define 
a direction system.” (Smith, 2014). The axes usually mentioned in this context are 
front/back, left/right, and above/below. Similarly, Irvin Rock describes a frame of 
reference as “a unit or organization of units that collectively serve to identify a coordinate 
system with respect to which certain properties of objects, including the phenomenal self, 
are gauged” (quoted in (Levinson, 1996). Along the same lines, Bill Brewer and Stephen 
Pears (1993) talk about frames of reference as devices for individuating places in terms of 
their spatial relations to some origin.  
In contrast, Roberta Klatzky’s explanation is of a deflationary kind: “a reference frame 
is a means of representing the locations of entities in space” (1998). However, if we think 
about frames of reference along the lines of Klatzky’s definition we will not be able to 
avail ourselves of any means of individuating frames of reference. For this reason, I shall 
interpret “frame of reference” robustly, that is, as involving an origin and a set of axes in 
terms of which spatial relations between objects can be identified.  
What is it for a frame of reference to structure experience? We can understand that 
phrase to mean, roughly, this: an experience E is structured by a frame of reference R just 
in case what it’s like to undergo E (E’s phenomenal character) is in part determined by R, 
which means that it is partly in terms of R that places (locations of objects) and relations 
between them are consciously represented by E. For example, suppose you see an apple on 
a table. The apple appears to stand in spatial relations to other items in the scene, e.g. it 
appears to be in front of and slightly to the left of your torso, above the floor, on top of the 
table etc. The frame of reference that structures your experience, then, is one that has you 
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(or some part of your torso) as an origin, and the usual left/right, front/back, above/below 
axes defining the direction system. Now, imagine you extend your hand in front of you so 
that your palm occupies the leftmost portion of your visual field. You can still see the apple 
as to the left, your palm as more to the left, and both of these in front of your torso. But 
another way of seeing such a scene is to see the apple to the right of your palm, and your 
torso as behind it. If this was the way the scene would appear to you, we could say that the 
frame of reference that has your palm as its origin (and the usual left/right etc. axes) 
structures your experience. 
Both the change in the origin and the axes of a structuring frame of reference can make 
a phenomenal difference to your experience. That difference may be manifested in e.g. 
experienced sameness of location. Building on the example above, suppose you move your 
hand so that your palm is now on the opposite side of the apple. If it seems to you that the 
apple is no longer on the right, then your experience is structured by the frame of reference 
centered on your palm. If it seems to you that it’s still on the left, then the structuring frame 
is centered on your torso. There is a phenomenal difference between seeing the apple as 
remaining on the left and seeing it as now on the left and previously on the right. Hence, 
the difference in the origin of a frame of reference that structures your experience makes a 
phenomenal difference. 
The difference in the type of directions defined by the frame of reference may also 
affect phenomenology. In the example above, the directions are relative to the origin of the 
reference frame (left/right, front/back). But they needn’t be. Your experience could be 
structured by an absolute frame of reference. E.g. it’s possible to feel the wind as blowing 
from the East, even as you turn your body around, so that you feel the wind first on your 
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face, then on the left side of your body, then on your back. It seems different than 
experiencing the wind as blowing first from the front, then from the left, then from the 
back, etc. Hence, the difference in the kind of axes that define a system of directions in a 
frame of reference that structures experience can likewise make a phenomenal difference.   
Conscious spatial representation is typically a representation of how the world appears 
in relation to the viewer. That is, it is typically structured by an egocentric frame of 
reference. An egocentric frame of reference is one whose origin is the subject’s point of 
view.1 While typically an egocentric frame of reference will have as its origin a region on 
the subject’s body, it’s not easy to say what is necessary and sufficient for a frame of 
reference to count as egocentric. Proposals include the immediate connection to the 
possibilities for the subject’s spatial action (e.g. Campbell, 1993; G. Evans, 1982), the 
representation of the subject’s spatial properties in an indexical way (e.g. Smith, 2014), as 
well as the identity of the origin of the frame with the subject’s body (e.g. Pick Jr & 
Lockman, 1981).  
Without taking a stand on this issue, and borrowing a term from Rock, I want to commit 
myself merely to the claim that for a frame of reference to count as egocentric, it is 
necessary that it have the “phenomenal self” as its origin. 
2.3.2 Failure to Meet the Embodiment Constraint  
One tactic to motivate premise 2 would be to argue that Borgy’s experience is spatially 
disunified because the egocentric frames that structure it are centered on distinct objects 
1 Perhaps this definition is so non-committal as to be completely uninformative. But any further assumption 
about what makes a given frame of reference egocentric is likely to be controversial. Additionally, “view” 
need not be taken in its literal sense. When I hear a sound as coming from the left, my experience is still 
structured by an egocentric frame of reference. 
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that aren’t (non-scattered) parts of any larger object. This criterion allows for ordinary 
perceptual experience to count as spatially unified. But it fails to rule in an imaginary 
experience that, it seems to me, would be a good example of a spatially unified experience. 
This is why: there does not appear to be any conceptual difficulty in imagining one’s 
bodily sensations (say, of touch) to occur in an object one experiences as spatially 
disconnected from the rest of one’s body. Suppose I’m undergoing a rubber-hand illusion, 
and the rubber hand is gradually moved further and further away from my body. While I 
don’t know what the actual experience in such an experiment would be like,2 it is at least 
conceivable that I could continue to feel sensations in the hand as it moves away from the 
rest of my body. Now, if I could do that, I could also undergo perceptions with spatial 
egocentric content specified by the frame of reference centered on the rubber fingers or the 
rubber palm. And, if I could do that, I could also, it seems, integrate the content of those 
perceptions with the egocentric spatial content given by the frame of reference centered on 
the rest of my body. But since I’d be able to do that, I don’t think this would entail an 
experience of two disconnected spaces; that is to say, nothing in my experience would 
suggest that I’m experiencing two disconnected spaces. 
More abstractly, it appears possible to seem to feel bodily sensations in objects that are 
not physically connected to my own body, and are not experienced as spatially contiguous 
with my body. And, furthermore, there is nothing incoherent in supposing that we could 
also undergo conscious perceptions whose spatial content is specified by a frame of 
2 Actual experiments (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Lloyd, 2007) suggest, though, that the illusion 
weakens as the distance increases; on the other hand, it is still felt in elongated hands, hands at an 
anatomically impossible distance from the subject, and ordinary objects like tables under the right 
circumstances. 
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reference centered on those detached body parts (e.g., I can touch the far side of a long 
table and experience it as under my fingertips, and at such and such a distance from my 
torso, despite the rest of my body being at the near side of the table). Now, it seems clear 
to me, however, that at no point in the rubber hand illusion did I begin to experience two 
disconnected spaces. And if that’s right, then the mere spatial discontinuity between the 
origins of the egocentric frames of reference does not suffice for spatial disunity. 
If the rubber hand illusion seems far-fetched, imagine a different scenario: imagine 
losing all proprioceptive sensation in your torso. It seems possible that you’d still integrate 
proprioceptive inputs from your feet, your hands and your head (your experience would be 
different than normal, but it would not be, I submit, an experience of disconnected spaces) 
into a conscious representation of a single space. It would still seem to you that you occupy 
a single space, even though now some parts of your body are experienced as not connected 
to other parts. 
As a result, it seems possible to (a) have an egocentric spatial experience whose content 
is in part specified by a frame of reference that’s centered on an object separate from the 
rest of our body and (b) have that content coordinated with the rest of our egocentric 
experiences without introducing any spatial disunity. Hence, the mere fact that Borgy’s 
experience is structured by three spatially separate origins does not establish that the 
experience is spatially disunified. To endorse a disunity judgment on the basis of Borgy’s 
having different spatially separated bodies one would have to accept that in the rubber hand 
and blind torso thought experiments one would experience spatial disunity. And this 
doesn’t seem right. 
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2.3.3 No Single Frame 
In this section, I argue against the view that Borgy’s experience is spatially unified 
because of the absence of a single frame of reference structuring all his experiences. The 
reasoning behind this way of attacking the spatial unity thesis is this: if Borgy’s experiences 
cannot all be related to a single egocentric frame of reference, then Borgy’s experience is 
spatially disunified. And his experiences cannot be so related. So, Borgy’s experience is 
spatially disunified. But we all agree that it is phenomenally unified. Hence, the spatiality 
thesis is false. 
What is it for any two experiences to be related to a single frame of reference? Consider 
Figure 2.1 below, composed of six images and two vertical lines: 
 
 
It seems that the above images fall within a single frame of reference. That is to say, 
there’s a way of specifying the spatial relations of all the images above to a certain object 
that counts as the origin (there are actually quite a few such ways). Each shape above, for 
example, can serve as such an origin.  
I call a frame of reference in terms of which one can specify spatial relations between 
all pictures in a given figure and the origin, a unifying frame. If the unifying frame is 
Figure 2.1 This array could be seen as a single scene, with the 
cloud-shape in the leftmost position, the sun-shape in the rightmost 
position, and the remaining shapes: a smiley face, a vertical line, a 
moon, a rectangle, another vertical line and a heart shape in 
between. But Borgy could see each pair of images separated by 
lines by means of a different body, without relating them all to a 
single frame of reference. 
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egocentric, then the viewer of the figure is the origin of the frame. Now, imagine that 
Borgy’s bodies have the following experiences: body1 experiences the “face” and the 
“cloud” only, body2 experiences the rectangle only and the “moon” only, and body3 
experiences the “heart” and the “sun” only. The idea driving Watzl’s and Roelofs’s 
interpretation of Bayne’s thought experiment could be that Borgy, while still retaining 
phenomenally unified consciousness of all those images, need not have his experience 
structured in any way by one unifying frame of reference in terms of which the six shapes 
above can be related to one another. One way to make this concrete would be to say that 
the moon could be experienced as occupying some location L1, and the cloud as occupying 
some other location L2, without the moon being experienced as in any way related to the 
cloud (e.g. as being to its right). That would be because there needn’t be a unifying 
egocentric frame of reference that structures Borgy’s experience, one in terms of which all 
locations could be experienced. Contrast that with a single-bodied experience one could 
have looking at Figure 2.2:  
 
 
Here, both the “cloud’s” location and the “moon’s” location are represented in a single 
experience, and they’re also experienced as on the opposite sides of the scene. This is in 
part because there’s a frame of reference that groups them all together, i.e. one that connects 
the “cloud’s” being on the right with the “moon’s” being on the left and that frame of 
Figure 2.2 The images from left to right: a moon-shape, a 
rectangle, a sun-shape and a cloud-shape 
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reference structures the visual experience of the scene. E.g., when you visually experience 
it, it seems to you that from your point of view, the “cloud” is to the right of the “moon.” 
The frame of reference that structures your experience is the unifying egocentric frame. 
Borgy, in contrast, has no such point of view. 
I think it’s clear that Borgy doesn’t have this kind of integration. Borgy sees the face, 
and he sees the heart, but he needn’t see the face as to the left of the heart. He need not 
have his experience structured by an egocentric frame of reference with respect to which 
the spatial properties of both the head and the heart are simultaneously specified. 
Hence, Borgy’s experience cannot be structured by a single egocentric frame of 
reference. It doesn’t follow, however, that this experience would be spatially disunified.  
One tempting way to show this would be to appeal to the theoretical distinction between 
vision for action and vision for perception developed by Goodale and Milner (Goodale & 
Milner, 1992). According to the distinction, vision for action and vision for perception are 
supported by anatomically distinct structures in the brain, play different functional roles 
and track different properties of the environment. Crucially for my discussion here, while 
vision for action makes use of egocentric properties of objects for precise guidance of 
actions, vision for perception tracks allocentric—that is to say viewer-independent—
properties of objects.  
There is another distinction between vision for action and vision for perception. 
According to Goodale and Milner’s proposal, it is the latter that correlates with conscious 
visual awareness. The former carries out its operations unconsciously. This explains shape- 
and color-constancy phenomena in conscious perception: the objects’ shapes and colors do 
not seem to us to depend on our perspective with respect to them. Now, however, it seems 
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to follow from this that the objects’ egocentric properties are not represented in conscious 
visual experience. This may strike one as counterintuitive. The content of my experience, 
after all, seems to be pervaded with how things seem to be from here (recall Tye’s 
description quoted at the beginning of this chapter).  
There are ways, however, of capturing this perspectival aspect of the phenomenal 
character of conscious visual experience without relying on egocentric frames of reference. 
Berit Brogaard mentions one such way in her discussion of the two visual systems 
hypothesis:  
The information about an object’s being over there or to the right of me which 
forms part of the content of visual perception is arguably allocentric in that it 
determines, for example, relative distances between an object and the perceiver. It 
importantly involves the perceiver in determining the axes of the scene, but it does 
not represent objects in egocentric space. As I perceive the scene in front of me, I 
perceive parts of my body, for example, my legs and my hands and fingers typing, 
and I can determine the relation of the clock over there or the soda can to the right 
relative to my hands and fingers. But my hands and fingers are landmarks in the 
scene. So, awareness of the position of the clock relative to my hands and fingers 
is awareness of the allocentric properties of an object (2012). 
This suggests that the distinction between vision for action and vision for perception 
provides an empirically grounded support for blocking the inference from the experiences 
being structured by no single egocentric frame to them being spatially disunified. This is 
because the experience Brogaard describes is not structured by any egocentric frame of 
reference (if you think that the subject represents the hands and legs as her own, and hence 
views the scene in egocentric terms, we may imagine that, as a result of some psychological 
condition, the subject is unaware that the hands and legs are hers), and yet it is spatially 
unified. But this still leaves the proponent of the No Single Frame criterion room for 
maneuver. 
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Goodale and Milner’s hypothesis does show that it is illegitimate to infer spatial 
disunity from no unifying egocentric frame of reference. But their hypothesis allows for 
there to be a unifying allocentric frame structuring perception. However, doubt may be cast 
even on the view that any kind of unifying frame of reference is necessary for spatial unity. 
E.g., Jerome Dokic and Elisabeth Pacherie (2006) hold that there could be perceptual 
experiences that do not involve any frame of reference (that is to say, according to Dokic 
and Pacherie, that these experiences are “perspective-free”):  
[I]t is not clear to us that the notion of a frame of reference is needed to explain the 
relevant phenomena [occurring when you’re looking at a picture of a bottle and a 
chair]. There is another way of seeing the array [in addition to representing the 
bottle as in front of the chair], namely by representing the bottle as being next to 
the chair. Of course there is a difference between seeing the bottle as being in front 
of the chair and merely seeing it as being next to the chair. The latter relation (x is 
next to y) is perspective-free and requires no analysis of the objects in component 
parts (it is enough that they be seen as two different wholes), whereas the former 
relation (x is in front of y) is perspective-bound and requires such an analysis 
(2006).  
If Dokic and Pacherie are correct, then there could be experiences that are not structured 
by any frame of reference; there could be “perspective-free” perceptions. 
Nonetheless, the bottle- and the chair-representing experiences are clearly spatially 
unified (the two objects are experienced as occupying the same space if anything is). But 
this unity is achieved without the two experiences’ being structured by any unifying frame 
of reference. If this is right, then it’s possible to have spatially unified experiences without 
a unifying frame structuring them. 
Dokic and Pacherie’s claim that no frames of reference are required to make sense of 
the visual experience of the bottle as being next to the chair is more radical than what the 
two visual systems hypothesis licenses. It is also not supported by empirical evidence. 
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However, if their claim expresses a coherent possibility, then the No Single Frame 
motivation for the disunity judgment is flawed. 
But could there be an experience of two objects as next to each other, without that 
experience, eo ipso, representing the two objects as being related in some more determinate 
way? Introspection seems to suggest that the answer to this question is negative. However, 
while we perhaps can’t visualize such experiences, we ordinarily undergo them in audition. 
Imagine hearing two people talk, without being able to see them (they’re in another room). 
The way you experience them is as being next to each other, without representing either as 
to the left or right of the other. So there are possible spatial experiences where objects are 
represented as next to each other, without that experience representing them as being 
related in some more determinate way. Dokic and Pacherie are right, at least when we 
expand our investigations beyond visual experience. 
2.3.4 No Spatial Relations 
Another way to motivate the disunity judgment is to say that Borgy perceives no spatial 
relations of any kind between an object O1, seen by body1 only and some other object O2, 
seen by body2 only. This is a fairly relaxed criterion, as it also allows all kinds of ordinary 
experience to count as spatially unified. The argumentative step seems obvious: if Borgy 
does not experience O1 and O2 as spatially related, then his experience is spatially 
disunified (let’s call this the No Relation—No Unity principle, NRNU for short). 
And Borgy experiences no such relations. So his experience is spatially disunified. But we 
all agree that it is phenomenally unified. So it’s possible to have a spatially disunifed and 
phenomenally unified experience. The spatiality thesis is false. 
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Bayne clearly states that Borgy perceives no spatial relationships between the objects 
consciously represented by different bodies. But I don’t think this dooms the spatiality 
thesis. The reasoning above exploits an ambiguity in the term “spatial relation.” On one 
reading, Borgy doesn’t experience objects as spatially related, but it doesn’t follow that his 
experience is spatially disunified. On another reading, it’s incorrect to say that Borgy 
doesn’t experience objects represented by different bodies as spatially related. But it will 
take some stage-setting to show all this. The next section is devoted to that. 
2.4 Spatial Disunity and Phenomenal Unity are Incompatible  
Our spatial experience isn’t always uniformly good at representing how things in the 
world are related to each other, and to us. Sometimes we experience the space around us 
with great acuity, other times we only get a crude representation of the spatial layout. To 
see this, compare how you experience the spatial world in vision with how you experience 
it in audition. It seems uncontroversial that the latter way of experiencing space is 
impoverished with respect to the former. Typically, vision is better for space perception 
than audition is.  
We may say that what’s characteristic of a better spatial experience consists, at least in 
part, in experiencing objects as determinately related (e.g. when I see the cup as to the left 
of the computer, at such-and-such a distance, and within reach), while in a spatially 
impoverished experience we experience them as determinably related as well (e.g., when 
I hear two people talking outside my office, without seeing them, I don’t represent who’s 
to the left of whom; I do represent them, however, as occupying a dimension that permits 
this sort of ordering without experiencing how they are actually ordered; on the other hand, 
I do represent determinately the relation of them being next to one another). 
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To represent two objects as determinately spatially related, relative to a spatial relation 
type T (e.g. being aligned on the left-right axis), is to represent them as exhibiting a 
particular ordering specified by T (e.g. to represent a glass as to the right of the laptop). To 
represent them as determinably spatially related relative to T is to represent them as 
occupying a dimension in which an ordering along T occurs, without experiencing them as 
ordered in any particular way (as in the hearing example above, I represent the two voices 
as determinably related along the left-right axis). Less formally, it is to represent that 
they’re related without representing the relation in any particular way.  
Now, one way to think about this kind of perceptual hierarchy is to adopt an idea from 
Sean Kelly’s Maurice Merleau-Ponty-inspired philosophy of perception. The basic thought 
that I wish to appropriate here is that our perceptual engagement with the world can be 
captured by adhering more or less closely to a norm (I remain neutral as to whether this 
creates some sort of a normative pull that is constitutive of experiencing things; all I’m 
interested in is that there is a norm at all). Kelly holds that perception necessarily involves 
awareness of how the current experience could be improved, as well as a compulsion to 
actually improve it. He summarizes his position thus:  
[P]erceiving an object involves … the perceiver’s already being driven to get a 
better grip on it. When I see an object, it is not up to me to decide to get a better 
view of the thing I’m looking at. Rather, it’s part of being experientially directed 
toward the object in the first place that this repulsion from lack of clarity is given 
to me (2010)  
Let’s say that the norm in question can be said to be the norm of full determinacy (the 
opposite, say, of the “lack of clarity” Kelly mentions; Merleau-Ponty at one point expresses 
the norm as “the maximum of visibility” (1998). Our experiences may fail to meet the norm 
in various ways. Think again about the case of hearing two people talking without seeing 
 
29 
 
them; my hearing alone doesn’t determinately represent who’s to the right of whom; it only 
represents them as next to each other; my experience could be improved—i.e. brought 
closer to meeting the norm of maximum determinacy—by looking at the two people. Were 
I to look at them, I would experience how they are actually ordered relative to, e.g., the 
left-right axis.  
Thus, if we arrange our experiences by how well they meet the norm, one end of the 
spectrum would be occupied by a kind of experience that represents objects as 
determinately ordered relative to all spatial relationship types (perhaps our visual 
experience comes closest to meeting that norm); it’s at least theoretically possible that near 
the other end of the spectrum are experiences that do not represent objects as determinately 
related to other things in any way. Rather, they represent the objects as determinably related 
to other things. That is to say, in such experiences objects would be represented merely as 
occupying a dimension that’s characterized by certain kinds of orderings among its 
occupiers, without representing how these particular occupiers are actually ordered. 
We can imagine having experiences falling, to varying degrees, short of the full 
determinacy norm. But could we undergo an experience from the very end of that 
spectrum? I think we could. I think there could be experiences with spatial content that 
only represent objects (or locations) as determinably related. But in order to see this, we 
need a detour through a different kind of, arguably spatial, experience.  
Casey O’Callaghan (2010) offers examples of experiences that, I think, could be called 
minimally spatial: “[1] awareness of a uniform sinusoidal tone at a given loudness … [2] 
experience [as of] a uniform-grey ganzfeld as a result of the application of halved table-
tennis balls over the eyes … [3] the uniform feeling of warmth on every skin surface.” 
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O’Callaghan thinks it at least might make sense to describe such experiences as spatial (as 
of, e.g., the sound being here). Likewise, in her pioneering work on the sense of smell, 
Clare Batty observes that smelling things has a similar phenomenological profile to the 
cases O’Callaghan mentions, at least as far as spatial content is concerned:  
If we bracket information gained from movement and any other sensory modality, 
and consider olfactory experience at-a-time, then we see that any locatedness of 
these properties — other than simply 'here' — goes as well. In this way, olfactory 
experience distinguishes itself from vision. Even at-a-time, visual experience 
achieves a robust form of differentiation that allows the presentation of properties 
at determinate locations in the scene before your eyes. The spatial presentation of 
olfactory experience at-a-time remains wholly undifferentiated (Batty, 2010)  
These are vivid illustrations of the many ways of experiencing the space around us, 
including the kind of undifferentiated, minimally spatial experience characteristic of what 
smelling may feel like. It seems right to say that in undergoing an olfactory experience, I 
am aware of the smell being simply here, in this place; I do not seem to be aware of it as 
being nowhere, but rather as filling the space.  
Mohan Matthen describes the phenomenology of olfaction in a similar way: “In the 
kitchen … I smell olive oil and garlic. Where are these odours? Simply here. They coexist 
in a place without combining” (Matthen, 2005), and so does David Chalmers: “an olfactory 
experience represents that a certain smell is present in one’s environment, perhaps in a 
certain broad location” (Chalmers, 2006). I think it is safe to assume that even though there 
isn’t much structure to the space as represented in olfactory experience, some minimal 
spatial content is undeniably present.   
To make the idea of a minimally spatial experience more precise and less reliant on 
examples, we may speculate that in such an experience the only spatial structure to be 
revealed would be that of an indiscrete space (a space in which no points are topologically 
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distinguishable). But it still would be an experience with spatial content (an indiscrete 
space is still a space). 
Let us say then that the previous examples, despite lacking any differentiation with 
respect to the stimulus, are examples of spatial experience. Now, take two experiences of 
the kind that Robert Van Gulick describes: “Imagine having just the experience of a dim 
flicker that passes so quickly that you cannot say where it occurred or whether it was of 
any given color or shape, or the experience of brief, faint sound whose location and tone 
one cannot discern. Such stripped-down experience seems possible” (2014). I would add 
to Van Gulick’s point that while it might be impossible to pinpoint the location of the flash 
or the sound, they would still seem to us to occur somewhere. The experiences seem to be 
spatial in some sense. This is because Van Gulick’s examples exhibit more structure than 
the smell and audition examples countenanced above, since the former allow for more 
differentiation (neither the flash nor the sound fills up the space around one uniformly, 
even though in neither experience is it determinately delineated where the stimulus is 
absent and where it is present). Since the smell experience has some spatial content, an 
experience that allows for more differentiation than a minimally spatial experience should 
also count as spatial. 
Yet, such an experience as Van Gulick describes doesn’t represent the flash, or sound, 
as spatially related to anything else one also represents in experience. So how can it count 
as spatial at all? This is where the notion of being experienced as determinably related may 
come in handy. The idea could be that in experiencing the flash/sound as in space, I 
experience it (or its location) as determinably related to other things I already experience 
as in space, without experiencing how they are related. This is just what it is to experience 
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something as merely occurring in space, to experience it as lying at the opposite end from 
the full determinacy norm. 
It seems extremely plausible that the kinds of olfactory and auditory experiences 
described by Batty and O’Callaghan are the kinds of experiences that creatures lacking 
conceptual sophistication may have. It also seems plausible that such creatures could 
experience flashes and sounds that Van Gulick mentions. But is it legitimate to ascribe to 
such beings an experience as of something being determinably related to other things? I 
think it is. To see this, we can appeal to the Autonomy Thesis, introduced, rejected (1992), 
and subsequently embraced (2014) by Christopher Peacocke. The idea behind Autonomy 
Thesis is that a creature may enjoy states with non-conceptual content without possessing 
any concepts at all. The content of an experience representing some things as determinably 
spatially related could then be taken as the kind of content we can ascribe to the creature 
without ascribing to it the possession of concepts required to specify the content. In 
addition, we can explain the creature’s behavior by appealing to this content. Imagine that 
our creature hears such a sound and finds it threatening. Given the spatial content of such 
an experience, we may expect the creature to start looking around in fear, trying to pinpoint 
the location from which the stimulus arrived (so that it can, e.g., determine the direction in 
which to escape). When asked why the creature is scanning the space around it, we can 
answer that it heard a threatening sound as being somewhere in the space it is experiencing, 
but did not perceive the sound’s location in any precise way. In short, it experienced the 
sound’s location as only determinably related to other locations it also represents. It seems 
to me that even simple creatures could have such an experience, characterized with the help 
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of the notion of autonomous content. We even serve some explanatory interests by 
ascribing such contents to make sense of the creature’s spatial actions. 
I will now argue that even two such minimally spatial experiences are spatially unified 
when they are phenomenally unified. This will, finally, allow us to see how to dissolve the 
ambiguity in the argument for disunity that I’m disputing here. 
Let’s repeat: the least that a minimal spatial experience entails is that the objects or 
places perceived are perceived as determinably spatially related to other entities. This is 
what is meant by the objects’ being perceived merely as occupying space. I think that the 
case of hearing two sounds without representing either as standing in a determinate spatial 
relation to the other illustrates what I mean well. Thus to ease exposition I focus on sounds 
in the argument below, but this is not mandatory.  
(1) Part of what it’s like to hear one sound is to hear it as coming from space. 
(2) Part of what it’s like to hear the other sound is to hear it as coming from space. 
(3) And there’s something it’s like to hear both (they’re phenomenally unified). 
(4) So they’re both individually experienced as coming from space (from 1-3). 
(5) If they’re both individually experienced as coming from space, then if they are 
experienced by the subject at the same time (i.e., if they are phenomenally unified), 
they are experienced as occurring in the same space. 
(6) So, if the two sounds are phenomenally unified, then they are spatially unified (from 
4 and 5). 
What remains is to justify premise (5). My justification for (5) is that to experience 
some object x as in space is, at least, to experience it as determinably spatially related to 
other things. Other things include, at least, currently experienced spatial objects (objects 
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experienced to be in space). Since both x and y are experienced as occurring in space, they 
are experienced as at least determinably spatially related to other things, including one 
another. And if they are so experienced, then they are experienced as occupying the same 
space. Notice, though, that although I need not experience any determinate spatial relations 
between the two objects in question, I would still experience them as spatially unified. And 
this would be in virtue of experiencing them as determinably, rather than determinately 
related. 
The argument generalizes, since the following principle seems almost trivially true: any 
experience as of an object in space is either an experience as of an object standing in 
determinate spatial relations to other things or as standing in determinable relations to other 
things. If so, then either the objects are experienced as occupying the same space in virtue 
of being experienced as determinately related, or they are experienced as occupying the 
same space in virtue of being experienced as determinably related. Hence, any 
phenomenally unified spatial experiences are also spatially unified. 
Now we can finally see an outline of a reply to the argument that Borgy’s experience 
is spatially disunified. It is true that Borgy does not represent the objects as determinately 
related. But it doesn’t follow that his experience is spatially disunified. NRNU principle 
only works when we take “spatial relations” to mean “determinable spatial relations.” But 
it is impossible for Borgy to experience two spatial occupiers without at least experiencing 
them as determinably spatially related. Thus, the argument above fails.  
Let’s now see how this would play out in Borgy: he perceives one duck as standing in 
some determinate spatial relations to his body1 and he perceives another duck as standing 
in some determinate spatial relations to body2. But, it seems to me, he also experiences the 
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ducks as being in space, as determinably related to other objects. The other objects, I take 
it, include those that are currently experienced to be in space. And these include both ducks. 
So both ducks are experienced as standing in determinable spatial relations to each other. 
So they are experienced as belonging to the same space. It thus appears like Borgy’s 
experience is not a counterexample to the spatiality thesis, pace Watzl and Roelofs. 
There’s a worry that by making spatial unity so much less restrictive, I’ve made it 
uninteresting. In particular, the kind of minimal spatial unity involved in experiencing 
some two things as relatable, but not related, is insignificant compared to a more robust 
sense of unity that we typically enjoy, and that it’s the latter that should really matter in the 
investigations of the sort I’m engaged in here. But then, one could wonder what principled 
reason there could be for making this distinction. It might be held that spatial unity is 
significant only to the extent that ascribing spatial content that represents the objects as 
being in the same space has some practical import when it comes to explaining actions. 
But, as I’ve argued above, even the experiences that Van Gulick mentions may have that 
kind of import. So this way of drawing the distinction between trivial and interesting kinds 
of spatial experience cannot rule out the minimal spatial unity I’m talking about. 
Moreover, it seems that if I’m right, then a certain way of thinking about the connection 
between spatial experience, the degree of its integration, and the unity of consciousness 
stands in need of revision. This would make the minimal spatial unity significant, at least 
for the view I’ll mention presently. The way of thinking I have in mind is pursued by 
Dainton, in the course of arguing that spatial unity is not necessary for phenomenal unity. 
Dainton writes:  
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experiences can be clearly and unambiguously co-conscious … even when their 
phenomeno-spatial relations are very indistinct, e.g., the distance and direction of a 
pair of simultaneously experienced sounds can be very unclear without impairing 
their co-consciousness in the slightest. If there could be … beings whose experience 
is only weakly integrated spatially, why couldn’t there be … beings whose 
experiences … unfold in several spatially distinct … fields? I can see nothing in the 
character of our … experience which suggests such beings are impossible. 
Consequently, even if human beings are incapable of enjoying a spatially disunified 
consciousness, due to some contingent features of our experience-generating 
equipment, there is no reason to suppose other types of being need be similarly 
restricted. (2003) 
If what I say in this paper is right, then there is reason to think that we cannot argue 
from the possibility of experience being less and less spatially integrated to the absence of 
spatial connectedness. This is because as we gradually decrease the degree to which 
experience is spatially integrated, the limiting case will not be “several spatially distinct 
fields” but rather experiences from the very end of the full determinacy norm. However, 
even when we remove all determinacy from the representation of spatial relations, we will 
still get an experience of a single space. This is because, as I have argued, even the 
experience of a spatial relation between two locations that’s completely indeterminate 
remains a spatially unified experience since the locations are experienced as being in the 
same space. Hence, it seems that Dainton’s reasoning runs afoul of the considerations 
specifically to do with minimal spatial unity. This makes the latter significant, at least for 
Dainton’s view.  
2.5 Summary 
I have argued that Bayne’s thought experiment does not have the significance for the 
spatiality thesis that Watzl and Roelofs claim for it. I did this by considering, and rejecting, 
several ways of motivating the judgment that Borgy’s experience is spatially disunified. 
As a consequence, the spatiality thesis remains a viable option, at least in the face of the 
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thought experiments based on multiple embodiment. In the next chapter I argue that non-
perceptual experiences of space (e.g. spatial imagination and spatial memory) are spatially 
unified with perceptual and somatic experiences. I also argue that there aren’t any 
perceptual experiences that are also not spatial.
 
  
Chapter 3: Imagination and Memory Experiences are Spatially 
Unified with Perceptual and Somatic Experiences 
3.1 Non-Perceptual Spatial Experiences 
In this chapter I argue that spatial imagination and spatial memory are spatially unified 
with perceptual experiences. That is, they have the kind of content that experientially 
anchors the imagined/remembered scene in the same space the remembering/imagining 
subject is also perceiving. This is not achieved via inference through background (maybe 
geographical) knowledge. Phenomenology of spatial imagination and spatial memory can 
be explicated in such a way that spatial unity between imagination and memory experiences 
is achieved without the mediation of background beliefs. Further, I argue that, despite some 
arguments to the contrary, all perceptual experiences of spatial objects (objects that have 
some spatial properties, like shape) are experiences as of those objects occupying space. 
The kind of imagination I consider is sensory imagination (visualizing, auditory 
imagination, tactile imagination, etc.); I set aside imagining as supposing a proposition to 
be true (i.e. propositional imagination). 
3.2 Imagining, Remembering, and Perceiving Space 
I will talk about imagination first. To focus our ideas, consider the following situation: 
when on a plane, I visually imagine a friend, Luke, having coffee at a café we both like to 
patronize. While I do the imagining, I’m also perceptually experiencing the inside of the 
plane, the taste of Diet Coke, the hum of the engines etc. How are the perceptual 
experiences related to the imaginative experience? 
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Well, obviously they are all my experiences. They are all parts of my overall unified 
conscious state. They are phenomenally unified with each other. Typically, I may 
introspect each of them, and I’m aware of them as my own. But what about the spatial 
properties and relations represented in perception and the spatial properties and relations 
represented in imagination? Is there a sense in which the locations represented, 
respectively, by imagination and perception (the café, the inside of the plane) are 
experienced as spatially related? 
One answer is that they are not experienced as related at all. The phenomenological 
distinction between my imagination and my perception is partially manifested in that they 
are experiences as of distinct, different, unrelated spatial environments (true, I may believe 
that I’m at such and such a distance from the café; but that does not, or need not, affect my 
overall, spatially disunified perceptual-imaginative experience; if you like, you can change 
the example to one where I’m imagining Frodo talking to Tom Bombadil; this is imagining 
a fictional space that I know to be unrelated to any perceivable place in the universe). If 
things imagined and things perceived are consciously represented as spatially unrelated, 
then imaginative experiences are not spatially unified with perceptual experiences.  
Below, I give three arguments why the antecedent in the above conditional is false. 
Things imagined and things perceived are experienced as spatially related. The first 
argument is from the possibility of superimposition. The second is from localizability of 
imagery. The third is from perspectivality of imagery. The first and the third arguments are 
the strongest. The third can also be applied to memory experiences. 
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3.2.1 Superimposing Images  
Let us call the space consciously represented in perception “p-space,” and the space 
consciously represented in imagination, “i-space.” Typically, p-space fills the entire visual 
field of a subject and even extends beyond it. In contrast, i-space is typically3 confined to 
the nearest vicinity of the imagined objects. 
The first argument why i-space is experienced as connected to p-space comes from the 
possibility of superimposition. It is possible for you to imagine any object superimposed 
on the scene you’re currently perceiving, that is, to imagine an object as being in your 
actual environment (imagining that a leprechaun is jumping on my desk, e.g.). But this 
merely means that, in imagining something in this way, you allow the perceived scene to 
impose some constraints upon the imagined object. In particular, you allow the perceived 
objects to somehow constrain how you imagine the imagined object.  
Let’s contrast superimposing imagination with what I’ll call “unconstrained” 
imagination. Suppose you’re imagining an elephant in an unconstrained way. This means 
that you don’t let the objects you’re seeing influence in any way how you imagine the 
elephant. The elephant doesn’t occlude, nor does it get occluded by the objects you 
perceive. The elephant doesn’t have to bend its knees in order to fit under the tree branches. 
It doesn’t need anything you perceive as a surface to support its weight. It doesn’t have to 
get out of other people’s and animals’ way when they walk around the perceived scene. 
The elephant is sheltered from any interactions with the objects you’re perceiving. 
3 This isn’t always the case, e.g. when you imagine being surrounded by snow everywhere, or being in an 
open sea on a dark and stormy night. 
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But you can also imagine the elephant as being in your perceived environment. That is, 
as, e.g. floating in the air, or standing on the ground, or dancing on the table, or resting 
against a tree, or as running away from people you see, or as chasing them. That is, you let 
the properties of perceived objects (their solidity, opacity, location etc.) to impose 
constraints on how you imagine the elephant.  
I contend that, for any imagined object, you can imagine that object either as subject to 
constraints imposed by objects in p-space or as not subject to those constraints. In the 
former case, you’d experience i-space and p-space as related, and hence as unified.4 What 
about the latter case?  
Consider the passage from unconstrained imagination to superimposing imagination in 
more detail. Suppose you’re sitting at a table on a patio, looking ahead. There are, let’s 
suppose, several other tables you also see: some are to the left, others straight ahead, and 
some others to the right. You also see the ground, some trees, maybe little bit of the sky. 
Now, as you’re sitting and enjoying the view, let’s suppose you also visualize a squirrel (in 
the unconstrained way; that is, you don’t recruit your perceptual experience to inform the 
image of the squirrel in any way); and then, after a while, you begin to imagine the squirrel 
in the superimposing way; i.e. you imagine it constrained by some properties of some 
objects of perception; you imagine it as within your environment. Let’s say, you imagine 
the squirrel as climbing the tree you’re seeing right in front of you. How do you do it? How 
do you insert the imagined squirrel into what you’re seeing? Well, you might need to do 
something to the imagined object to make the transition from the unconstrained 
imagination to the superimposing imagination. You might need to change certain aspects 
4 Again, you need not thereby believe them to be unified or related. 
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of the imagined object. For instance, part of what you need to do to superimpose the 
imagined squirrel upon the tree could be to change some aspect, A, of the imagination-
experience so that, once you change A, you imagine the squirrel as close to the tree. But 
perhaps you don’t have to change A. Perhaps you’d already imagined the squirrel, in the 
unconstrained way, such that you don’t now have to change A in order to imagine the 
squirrel as close to the tree. So either you have to change A or you don’t.  
How can one determine whether you need to change A? Whether A needs to be changed 
depends, it seems to me, on where the squirrel, as imagined in the unconstrained way, was 
with respect to the perceived tree. But since you have imagined the squirrel, in the 
unconstrained way, as allowing for spatial comparisons with the objects of perception, you 
must have imagined it as in some as occupying some common overarching framework with 
the tree, one in which their respective locations can be compared. Since the switch from 
unconstrained to superimposing imagination is possible for all objects imagined, all objects 
imagined have to be experienced as sharing some framework with perceived objects. Since 
this framework allows for comparison between locations, it is some sort of spatial 
framework. So, the imagined and the perceived objects are seen as sharing some common 
spatial framework. 
Here, I think, two premises are particularly susceptible to objections. First, the 
universal generalization concerning all objects and scenes that we can visually imagine. 
Second, the claim that for us to experience something as potentially subject to constraints 
imposed by objects in p-space, that thing must be already experienced as spatially relatable 
to places and objects in p-space. I can think of no counterexample to the first premise, 
however. As for the second, it seems to me that the following holds. If we didn’t experience 
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imagined objects as spatially relatable to perceived scenes, it would seem to require a 
separate act of imagination to switch between unconstrained imagination and 
superimposing imagination. But, in fact, no such effort is required. We can have the same 
imagined object switch from one to other kind of imagination in a single act of imagining. 
3.2.2 Localizing Imagery 
The second argument is the argument from the localizability of the visual image. Think 
first about a photograph. It represents some scene that has a location in the world. But the 
photograph itself, taken as a physical object, also has a location in the world, different than 
the location it represents. Now, for any experience involving visual imagery, we can 
perhaps draw a similar distinction, between the represented location and the location of 
representation. There are two reasons to think that the location of representation, when that 
representation is a visual image, is (a) consciously experienced (b) as a location in p-space. 
The first is phenomenological: it seems that, when you’re entertaining a visual image, you 
are aware of its location somewhere in front of your eyes, say, or “in your head” (see e.g. 
(Smart, 1959)). Another reason comes from research on grapheme-color synesthesia 
(Dixon, Smilek, & Merikle, 2004). The difference in the results of the Stroop test between 
two kinds of grapheme-color synesthetes has been attributed to the difference in where the 
visual images seem to be located (inside the subject’s head or somewhere in external 
space). Either way, these images are localizable in the space the subject is also perceiving 
(we might think of it as egocentric or behavioral space, a la Evans (1985)). Hence, there is 
spatial unity between i-space and p-space. 
One worry about this argument is that it might rely too much on the similarity between 
visual images and photographs. Perhaps, it might be said, not all visual images need to be 
 
44 
 
like photographs. It need not always be the case that we’re aware of where the image is, 
with respect to our eyes or head. Again, however, it is not clear how much of a bite such 
an objection would have. It is difficult to imagine a case where one is entertaining a visual 
image without being aware of where, in one’s visual space, that image is. A different 
problem has to do with whether the expression “in one’s head” should be taken literally to 
refer to a spatial location. Here, we can point again to the experiment on synesthesia. The 
difference between the results of the two groups of synesthetes was explained by reference 
to the fact that those who experienced the image in their heads experienced it as being 
spatially closer than those who experienced it as in the external world. It was the difference 
in the distance to the visual image that was taken to explain the difference in task 
performance speed. This suggests that the “in the head” locution could well be taken 
literally. And if that’s the case, then the location of the image is the location in the same 
space that the subject is also perceiving. 
Another objection is that the argument merely shows the spatial unity between the 
representational vehicle (the imagined image) used in the imagining and p-space. It doesn’t 
show the latter’s connection to i-space. But in accounting for the first kind of unity, the 
argument above accounts for how every part of the imagined scene or object is experienced 
as related to objects in p-space. Suppose I’m imagining my dog. In so doing, I’m 
entertaining a visual image of the dog. Suppose further that I’m experiencing that image a 
little in front of my eyes. There is a way in which the dog’s tail, being on my right, is 
experienced as closer to the door (also on my right, but in p-space) than the dog’s head. 
Such relations can be experienced for every part of the image I’m entertaining. It is hard 
for me to see what more could be required from two experiences being spatially unified. 
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This argument might be seen to rely too much on the photograph metaphor. It might 
also beg questions in the imagery debate that are too controversial to be begged. Lastly, it 
might be seen as phenomenologically suspect. Hence, in the absence of some definitive 
answers in the imagery debate, the argument above is not very effective.  
3.2.3 Perspectivality 
The last argument is the argument from perspectivality of imagery. Let’s say that two 
locations are spatially connected if there is a path from one to the other. And for you to 
know there’s a connection, you don’t need to actually know the particular path. E.g., for 
Sydney and New York to be spatially connected, all that’s needed is that there be a path 
from Sydney to London, and that there be a path from New York to London. I take it that 
experienced spatial connectedness is sufficient for spatial unity. 
Based on these remarks, we may advance the following line of thought: when you 
imagine something perceptually, you imagine it in relation to yourself. Imagined Luke is 
“over there” to the right or left, in front of you. That is, you imagine Luke from a 
perspective, from a point of view (Peacocke (1985), Gregory (2010), Martin (2002), 
Husserl (1913/1952): apparently a consensus position at least about visualization). At any 
rate, Luke is imagined as oriented in some way with respect to you. He has a facing surface 
and a hidden surface; and for that, he needs to be positioned in some relation to your point 
of view. And this point of view which you occupy when imagining Luke can always be i-
spatially related to the imagined object or scene. That is, it’s possible to point, roughly, to 
a location you’d have to occupy with respect to Luke to see him in roughly the way you’re 
imagining him. That is, the point of view from which you imagine Luke is roughly 
specifiable, given the content of your visualization. 
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Bernard Williams (1973) and Michael Martin (2002) express divergent thoughts 
concerning the location of the point of view from which things are imagined. According to 
Williams, the point of view from which you imagine things is not located within the 
imagined world (in i-space, as I would say) at all. Martin claims, however, that this view 
fails to explain our ability to account for certain differences in the visualization’s content. 
Martin says:  
One can visualise a red light to the left and a green light to the right. If you now 
visualise the reverse—a green light to the left and a red one to the right—how you 
are visualising is different from the first case. Furthermore, this doesn’t just reflect 
a difference in the episode of visualising, rather the two differ because what is 
visualised is different in the two cases. In the one case the red light is on the left, 
the green on the right; in the other the green is on the left, the red on the right. But 
now we can ask what difference need there be in the imagined scene in order for 
what has been imagined to be different in the two cases? Note, first, that in a world 
which contains merely two spots of light, there can be no difference between the 
two situations. The two situations count as different only where there is a point of 
view relative to which the one object is to the left and the other to the right, or vice 
versa. So, if we absent a point of view from the imagined scene, then what appears 
in visualising to be a difference in the scene imagined, and not just a difference in 
one’s state of mind cannot be so. Contrary to Williams’s position, … there must be 
a point of view within a visualised scene, at least where the visualising involves 
perspectival elements and those determine aspects of what is visualised. (2002) 
I think that Martin’s reasoning is persuasive and will assume it in what follows. When 
you’re visualizing something, your point of view is a point of view in i-space, and the range 
of its possible locations in i-space is determined by the perspectival content of your 
imagination experience.  
Yet, the very point of view that you occupy is itself in real space: it’s also the one from 
which you actually perceive things (you can, of course, imagine how things would look 
like from a different point of view than the one you’re actually occupying; but the very act 
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of imagining would still be done from your actual point of view, unless, of course, you lack 
perceptual experiences—but this is not the situation we’re interested in here). 
When you imagine things, you imagine them as they would be related to you. Let’s 
suppose, with Dominic Gregory (2013), that a visual point of view consists in an origin 
and a set of labeled axes defining directions (front, left, right, etc.). I claim that it’s plausible 
to think that the location of the origin of the point of view from which things are imagined, 
and the location of the origin of the perceptual point of view overlap.  
 
This is because as you visually imagine things, you imagine how things would look 
like from some point of view. In visualizing an object, you visualize it in some direction at 
some distance from you. To do this, your point of view has to be supplied with not only an 
origin but also with a set of axes defining directions, so that it makes sense to say that the 
imagined object is in front of you, to your left or right, etc. How these axes are labeled (i.e. 
where “directly ahead,” “left” and “right” are) determines where your point of view’s 
Left 
Right 
Front 
Figure 3.1 The arrows indicate the directional axes, the grey circles indicate 
objects of imagination, and black squares indicate objects seen. 
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origin would have to be for you to visually perceive the objects just as you visualize them. 
That is, they determine the location of your point of view in the imagined world. Now, 
however, you’re also entertaining a visual perspective on the world you’re visually 
perceiving. In so doing, you see some things to the left, others to the right, others directly 
in front. But, just as in visualizing, in perception “the point of view from which one 
perceives is marked in one’s visual experience through it being the point to which the 
objects perceived are presented—if one can fix the location of those objects, one thereby 
determine the location of the point of view” (Martin, 2002). And, we should add, one fixes 
the location of objects by employing the labeled axes. 
Now, the “leftishness” of the imagined object, and the “leftishness” of the perceived 
object are not phenomenologically distinguishable. There is, of course, a phenomenal 
difference between visualizing something as being on the left and seeing something as 
being on the left (as Martin points out, for instance, “in imagining something as to the left 
one does not thereby imagine as in one’s actual environment on the left” (2002)). But the 
direction in which you see/visualize the object does not contribute to the difference in 
phenomenology. It’s the same direction. In the more technical terms, the axis describing 
the direction “left” is the same axis for both the experience of imagining and the experience 
of seeing. This is true for all the axes that determine the location of your point of view in 
the imagined world. They overlap with the axes that determine the location of your 
perceptual point of view, in the real world. But since they do that, they determine the same 
location in both cases.  
I may, of course, imagine myself to occupy a different spatial position and imagine 
how things would look like from there. But how things would look like from there would 
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be presented in terms of the axes (some things would be in front, others to the left, others 
still to the right) that overlap with the axes that determine the location of my perceptual 
point of view (where some things are in front, to the left, and to the right). The things would 
be presented to my actual point of view.  
So, we can trace a path from an imagined object to the location of your actual point of 
view (the point of view from which you’re doing the imagining which coincides with your 
actual point of view, and not the point of view you imagine yourself to be occupying, which 
doesn’t coincide in this manner with your perceptual point of view). Then we can trace a 
path from your actual point of view to a perceived object. Hence, the perceived scene and 
the imagined scene are spatially connected without being spatially related (or at least, 
they’re not experienced as related in the way that the cup and the book you’re perceiving 
are experienced as related). This is what is meant by saying that the subject’s point of view 
anchors the imagined space to the real (or at least the perceived) space. 
Such connectivity with respect to other relations in terms of which unity of 
consciousness is explained is usually thought sufficient to account for phenomenal unity 
(e.g. Watzl’s attentional connectedness (2014), Masrour’s “Leibnizian” connectedness 
(2014)) I don’t see why it shouldn’t be sufficient in this case (or, if you don’t think that 
connectedness is sufficient, then this is a weakness my view shares with other plausible 
views on phenomenal unity; I’m OK with being in the same boat as Watzl and Masrour). 
We might speak here of experiential spatial connectedness, without actual spatial 
connectedness; indeed, it might be experiential spatial connectedness without the subject’s 
believing in any actual connectedness. 
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One problem with this view is that some visual experiences need not involve 
perspectival-ness (cf. (Dokic & Pacherie, 2006) and section 3.3); however, cases such as 
described by Dokic and Pacherie (where two objects can be visually experienced, in a 
“perspective-free” manner, as merely being next to each other) can be reinterpreted as 
involving the representation of two locations only, in a roughly topological way: inside 
(corresponding to where the subject experiences himself to be) and outside (corresponding 
to every place that is not where the subject is). Then, any two objects seen as “outside” 
would be seen as next to one another (i.e., as both occupying a location that is not the 
subject’s location) without being seen in any other relation to one another and without 
being seen as having a particular orientation. Perhaps ordinary human perceivers can’t 
visualize such experiences.  
Even so, the inside, in this case, would coincide with the point of view from which 
typical visual perception occurs. We might say that while there are directional axes in 
ordinary visual perception, the only kind of spatial relations represented in the kinds of 
experiences Dokic and Pacherie mention would be topological relations. However, since 
to represent something to the left or right of me requires representing it as out there, this 
complication raises no problem for my view. 
3.2.4 Memory Experiences 
An experience of remembering seems phenomenologically similar to an experience of 
imagining (cf. Byrne (2010)). One reason for thinking so is that both in memory and in 
imagination one can adopt different perspectives on the event imagined/remembered. One 
can imagine/remember from 1st-person point of view; and one can do so from a 3rd-person 
point of view (see e.g. (Rice & Rubin, 2011). Using the same ability to switch perspectives, 
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to change the way from which you’re viewing the scenes seems to require some common 
component in both memory and imagination experiences. At the very least, it requires that 
the events be imagined/remembered from some perspective. Given this is right, then at 
least the perspectivality argument can be repeated for the recollective experiences as well 
as for the imaginative experiences.  
As a result, I take it that memory experiences should lend themselves to a similar 
treatment as imagination experiences. Hence, they present no additional problem for spatial 
unity of experience.  
It might also be held that some memory and imagination experience involve (only) an 
experience of conscious thinking about the situation you’re imagining/remembering. Such 
experiences don’t seem impossible (in fact, it’s how it seems to me that I 
imagine/remember most things). Whether such experiences exhibit spatial phenomenology 
hangs on whether conscious thought exhibits spatial phenomenology. I will argue in 
Chapter 4 that they do. If I’m right about thoughts, then such intellectual kinds of 
imagination and memory experiences don’t provide a counterexample to the thesis that 
phenomenal unity requires spatial unity. 
3.2.5 Unity without Distance? 
Consider next the case described by Mohan Matthen (2014), seemingly showing spatial 
disunity in imaginative experience: “[O]ne can visualize two objects without imagining 
how they are related to one another. For instance, one might image the Eiffel Tower and 
the Tokyo Tower side by side in order to compare them, with the Eiffel Tower on the left. 
Yet, one might not imagine a specific distance between the two landmarks.” It’s unclear to 
me whether Matthen intends this observation to count against the spatial unity between the 
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two experiences (of the Eiffel Tower and the Tokyo Tower). After all, one could also trace 
a path from one tower to another through the subject’s point of view. Secondly, the towers 
could still be imagined as spatially related without imagining a specific distance between 
them. They could be imagined as merely determinably related, with a determinable, but 
not determinate distance between them. Lastly, for the example to work, the representation 
of one tower must be spatially related to the representation of the other tower. 
This concludes my discussion of memory experiences and imagination experiences. 
They don’t seem to present a challenge to the spatial unity view. 
3.3 Non-spatial Seeing 
Another problem for the view I’m proposing arises from considerations of what the 
experience of some patients with Balint’s syndrome is like. One of the best-studied patients 
in this area is known in the literature as RM. RM’s performance in various experiments 
suggests that his ability to perceive spatial objects does not require the ability to perceive 
“space as such” (Schwenkler, 2012). In particular, RM seems unable to locate the objects 
he’s perceiving anywhere in objective space, and yet, he’s able to accurately perceive the 
objects’ shapes. This has led some theorists to postulate that RM doesn’t perceive the 
objects as in space at all. This view threatens the spatial unity thesis, because if RM doesn’t 
perceive an object as in space, then he cannot perceive it as spatially unified with anything 
else. 
3.3.1 Does RM Fail to Perceive Space?  
The argument, proposed by John Schwenkler seems to be premised on the idea that RM 
fails to perceive objects’ locations and orientations, but he does perceive the objects 
themselves. Schwenkler describes the case thus:  
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RM had suffered a pair of strokes that resulted in severe damage to his posterior 
parietal cortex, and as a consequence was unable to localize the objects he saw. For 
example, when shown a display with a target at one of five locations along the 
vertical or horizontal meridians and told to report whether the target’s position was 
up, down, or center (in the vertical blocks) or right, left, or center (in the horizontal 
ones), RM averaged only 70% correct across all conditions. Similarly, when 
instructed to judge the relative position – left or right in one block, up or down in 
the other – of an „X‟ with respect to that of an „O‟ that was also presented on the 
screen, RM was correct approximately 50% of the time, a performance no better 
than chance (Friedman-Hill, Robertson, & Treisman, 1995). RM could detect the 
target stimuli well enough; he just couldn’t tell where they were, either on the 
screen itself or with respect to other things. 
Schwenkler concludes that RM doesn’t perceive the objects as arranged in a larger 
spatial framework at all: “his experience was of a wholly unimaginable sort: not of oriented 
spaces that were cut off at the boundaries of the things that occupied them, but of things 
without spatial locations or orientations. RM perceived shapes that did not appear to be in 
space at all.” RM’s experience thus falsifies the thesis that experience of objects requires a 
representation of space as some sort of overarching framework. Indirectly, it also provides 
a counterexample to the spatiality thesis, endorsed by this work. However, the conclusion 
that Schwenkler draws does not actually follow. RM’s results are consistent with the view 
that he does perceive objects as in space, but that the kind of information about their 
location he is able to extract is severely limited.  
Furthermore, Schwenkler’s interpretation of what RM’s experience is like is 
inconsistent with a range of other experimental results and observations made on RM. 
Firstly, Robertson et al. (1997) report that even though RM did poorly in identifying which 
of the array of objects was in motion, he nonetheless “frequently reported seeing motion in 
displays that included no moving objects … He would complain that the stationary letter 
whose color or identity he was naming was drifting about on the screen.” Now, it does 
seem impossible to experience motion of an object without experiencing a change of the 
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object’s position relative to some reference frame. RM couldn’t have experienced the 
letters moving, had he not experienced them as changing locations. It is difficult to see how 
such an experience could be accounted for while maintaining that RM is unable to see the 
moving object as in space. 
Another set of results that appears inconsistent with Schwenkler’s view is the data on 
reaching in RM (Baylis & Baylis, 2001). In the experiments, RM is asked to reach to one 
of the twelve locations at which a point of light appears. He is better than chance, though 
his results still are low for the task that’s relatively easy. The results of these experiments 
suggest that RM’s grasp of locations in egocentric space is fairly good. But being able to 
locate an object in egocentric space seems to imply some ability to experience the object 
in relation to oneself. And hence, as occupying the same spatial framework. 
However, care should be taken when drawing conclusions about spatial perception 
from the tasks requiring the subject to perform an action. Given the empirical discoveries 
concerning the two visual systems hypothesis (Goodale & Milner, 1992), the reaching data 
should not be used as evidence for what kind of experience RM is a subject of. This is 
because, roughly speaking, the system guiding visual action and that responsible for 
conscious vision function largely independently of one another, and the results from 
experiments examining visually-guided action should not be used to form conclusions 
about visual experience (or, more generally, visual perception). 
Interestingly, Baylis & Baylis have also examined RM’s ability to report on perceived 
stimuli without engaging in reaching behavior. In one experiment, RM was required to 
merely name (without reaching) the location at which the stimulus appeared (in egocentric 
terms) and, again, his errors, though multiple and more frequent than in the reaching task, 
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are mostly mistakes concerning depth (RM gets the direction—left, right, center—correct 
much more often than chance, but he frequently seems incapable of judging correctly 
whether the objects are nearer or farther away from him). Mistakes in direction but not the 
depth of the stimulus were rarer, mistakes in both, rarer still. There then seems to be a good 
case for thinking that RM perceives the object at least in relation to himself, and even that, 
in part, the perception is accurate (after all, he was above chance, though not as good as 
regular perceivers, in determining whether the object appeared on the left or right). There 
is, then, at least an implicit representation of one object (himself) spatially related to 
another (images on the screen). And for this, it seems that representing these objects as 
occupying a single spatial framework is required. 
Similarly, another set of experiments conducted on RM by Phan et al. (2000) suggests, 
in the experimenters’ own words, that RM “has some ability to localize stimuli with respect 
his own body” and that he is able to use an egocentric frame of reference to do so. This, in 
turn, suggests that RM can experience objects as in a place that’s distinct from the one his 
body occupies. Plus, the use of an egocentric frame of reference implies some ability to 
represent objects as occupying the same space as his body does. 
It might be objected that the experiments Schwenkler bases his interpretation on were 
made earlier than the ones conducted by Baylis & Baylis and Phan et al. RM’s condition 
may have improved by the time he was examined the next time. Or, it might be that the 
nature of the tasks was different enough that the experiences evoked were correspondingly 
different. These objections are well-taken. It seems to me, however, that one reason that 
may be offered to offset the strength of these objections is that we may explain all the 
experimental data (i.e. those appealed to by Schwenkler, and those related above) by 
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postulating impaired, but not non-existent representation of space. In this way, RM’s 
improvement over time would be one of degree (increasingly more detailed representation 
of space) rather than in kind (some representation of space vs. no representation of space). 
We would have to give divergent explanations of the two sets of results, if we work along 
the lines that Schwenkler recommends. A (more) unitary explanation seems better than a 
non-unitary explanation. A less radical explanation seems better than a more radical one. 
Thus, in the next section I propose an interpretation of RM’s initial results that allows for 
seeing his improvement as a gradual progression. 
3.3.2 Growing Determinacy of Spatial Vision 
I take it that Schwenkler’s reasoning proceeds along the following lines: RM 
consciously represents an object at least well enough to detect it and recognize it. But he 
denies knowledge of the identified object’s location. Nor is he able to accurately detect the 
object’s orientation. RM, then, has a conscious experience of objects, and of their intrinsic 
spatial relations, without being aware of them as in space at all. 
First of all, it seems to me that it doesn’t in general follow from one’s inability to locate 
an object with respect to another that one does not perceive the object as in space. For 
consider the following situation: you have your eyes closed. You hear two people talking. 
The spatial content of your auditory experience doesn’t specify the spatial relation between 
the two voices. You can’t tell who’s to the right of whom. That is, you seem to perceive 
two objects without being able to perceive how they’re spatially related to one another, 
what their orientation is, etc. But it doesn’t seem to follow that you don’t perceive them as 
in space at all. At the very least you hear them both as out there, even though you can’t 
really tell where they are with respect to one another. You’d score poorly on a test 
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measuring your capacity to locate one sound with respect to the other. However, you 
wouldn’t experience the sounds as not in space. It is possible that RM’s visual experience 
is similar to ordinary auditory experience, as far as the spatial content it provides is 
concerned. 
The experimental results and the patient’s reports Schwenkler appeals to are consistent 
with the idea that RM’s visual experience is in some respects like our regular auditory 
experience; it may only represent some spatial relations without representing any other 
spatial relations; in particular, it might represent location broadly enough that little 
information useful to do well in the experimental paradigm could be extracted from this 
representation. Schwenkler seems to assume that to represent something visually as in 
space, we need to represent its precise location. But this isn’t a necessary truth. Spatial 
representation is varied. The confusing nature of RM’s reports might reflect the unusual 
poverty of his visual experience of space, rather than the complete absence of the 
representation of space as such. 
I take it that anyone in RM’s situation would be confused by not being able to perceive 
the precise location of objects one used to be able to localize precisely. This inability would 
presumably lead some rational persons to make reports that RM is quoted as making (“I 
can’t see where it is”); it would, it seems, make a rational person particularly reluctant to 
guess the location of the stimulus. Compare RM’s predicament with the following 
situation. If all I know about the location of a bear is that it’s outside (that’s all I heard on 
the radio, say), and then you’d ask me where the bear is, I could reasonably say that I don’t 
know, especially if I assumed you meant a specific spatial location, or a specific relation 
to some other place e.g. our favorite spot in the woods, or even with respect to my own 
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point of view or your body or whatever. Further, if I kept switching radio stations only to 
find out from their reports that the bear is outside (perhaps each formulated in a different 
way, or sometimes in a different language), and you kept asking me for (what I’d assume 
would be) its precise location or orientation, I’d continue denying knowledge of that. It 
would not, however, mean that I’m not aware of the bear as in space at all. My 
representation of the bear’s spatial relations would be impoverished but not nonexistent. 
The data Schwenkler cites (RM’s poor results when determining the locations of objects) 
is consistent with such an impoverished way of representing space as such.  
Now I think RM’s results that Schwenkler points to could be described in a similar 
way. Sure, RM’s representation of space is severely impaired. But, arguably, it could be 
that it’s impaired in roughly the way my representation of the space surrounding the bear 
is. RM experiences the objects as occupying determinable locations, without perceiving 
determinate ones just like I know that the bear is at some determinable location without 
knowing where it is. The difference is, of course, that I’m learning about the bear through 
testimony, and RM is learning about the object(s) through sensory experience. But that 
doesn’t seem to show that what (the kind of information) we learn has to be different. 
In other words, an alternative interpretation of RM’s case is that there seems to be 
representation of objects as in a determinable, but not determined, location in egocentric 
space, perhaps against some undifferentiated background. This interpretation shows that 
there is some experience of at least some spatial relations between objects (or locations); 
and to experience spatial relations between different objects, it seems necessary to 
represent them as occupying some common encompassing framework. Hence, RM’s 
experience is not a counterexample to the thesis Schwenkler sets out to refute. A fortiori, 
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it’s not a counterexample to the spatiality thesis. It’s possible to represent an object as in 
space without representing its location in a determinate way. 
One problem with my interpretation is that it ignores the following aspect of RM’s 
performance: he is able to recognize objects (such as letters or short words); hence, he is 
able to represent fairly detailed intrinsic spatial relations (those holding between parts of 
the object) without being able to recognize the objects’ orientations. This leads Schwenkler 
to conclude that RM doesn’t perceive the objects as in space at all. However, correctly 
identifying a complex object does not require correctly identifying its orientation even in 
ordinary experience. Ordinary humans are fairly good at categorizing such objects as 
animals even in far peripheral vision. E.g. subjects performed way above chance even for 
stimuli appearing at eccentricity 51.5° when the task was to categorize the target stimulus 
(Thorpe, Gegenfurtner, Fabre‐Thorpe, & Buelthoff, 2001). However, in an experimental 
paradigm by (Sally & Gurnsey, 2003) the subjects’ judgments of the spatial orientation of 
the stimulus was poor (at chance) when the stimulus was removed from foveal vision even 
by as little as 8°. This suggests that the ability to correctly categorize a complex stimulus 
and the ability to correctly report stimulus orientation could come apart even in ordinary 
(peripheral) vision. But it doesn’t seem right to say that the stimuli that are correctly 
categorized are therefore experienced as not in space at all. Hence, RM’s results in which 
he was able to correctly identify objects without being able to correctly determine their 
orientation don’t show that he perceived the complex objects as not in space. 
So, there is a competing interpretation of RM’s results, roughly along the following 
lines. In the initial set of experiments RM is able to perceive locations only determinately 
(perhaps merely as out there). This ability improves with years, as he is able to perceive 
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the locations as increasingly determinate (in front, to the left or right etc.). This is a 
difference in degree, rather than the one in kind that accepting Schwenkler’s interpretation 
would force us to postulate. Other things being equal, it seems more parsimonious and 
hence preferable. Crucially for my overall view, it also allows us to see that RM’s 
experience is not a counterexample to the spatiality thesis. RM’s perceptual experience is 
spatially unified. 
3.4 Seeing without Connecting 
It has been suggested that when you are experiencing phosphenes you experience them 
as not belonging to the same space as the objects of perception. That is, even though a 
phosphene experience has some spatiality, it doesn’t appear to the subject that the 
phosphene is in the same space as the things perceived. In this section I argue that this is a 
misguided view. 
When it comes to experiences such as phosphenes, “seeing stars” or viewing 
afterimages, we seem to be faced with two intuitive judgments as to the spatial 
phenomenology of these experiences. On the one hand, it doesn’t seem to us as if the 
phosphenes etc. are external to us in the same way that ordinary objects of perception are. 
There’s a phenomenological difference, as Susanna Siegel (2006) puts it, between seeing 
stars and “seeing” “stars.” On the other hand, it is not as if phosphenes and “stars” are 
experienced as lacking spatial properties and failing to stand in spatial relations altogether. 
These experiences do seem to have some spatial relational content with respect to the 
subject: as Siegel observes, they appear in front rather than in the back, for instance.  
One way to get the result that a phosphene experience is spatially connected with other 
(perceptual) experiences, while respecting both intuitions is, again, through the notion of a 
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path. Just as the imagined Eiffel Tower is imagined from a point of view, so does a 
phosphene occupy a rather determinate location with respect to your body (right in front of 
your eyes). Again, this determinate location is a location with respect to your point of view. 
The same point of view you’re enjoying when perceiving things. So, there is a traceable 
path from the phosphene, through you, to what you’re perceiving. 
However, it seems to me that going about spatial unity in the phosphene case by 
drawing a path through your point of view seems unnecessarily complex to account for the 
phenomenology. But this should give us pause. Why is that the case? One explanation why 
the path explanation seems unnecessarily complex here is that phenomenologically, it does 
seem that the phosphene appears closer to my eye than, say, the tree I’m seeing. My 
conjoint experiences (perceiving the tree and experiencing the phosphene) provide me with 
enough resources to make these sorts of spatial comparisons. This seems sufficient to claim 
that the two experiences exhibit spatial unity. 
There is a way, then, of describing the phosphene experience in which the phosphene 
is experienced as related to objects the subject is currently perceiving. There’s a sense in 
which it seems closer to your eye than, e.g., the tree you’re also seeing (even though the 
phosphene doesn’t present itself as three dimensional; that, by itself, should not make us 
judge the phenomenology of having phosphenes to be, somehow, endowed with some 
mysterious, extraordinary spatiality; we see rays of light and reflections all the time but we 
don’t suppose they occupy some different space just because they’re experienced as two-
dimensional; seeing a phosphene is very much like seeing a patch of light).  
Perhaps to account for the phenomenology of seeing phosphenes not to occupy the 
perceived space, one needs to make a distinction between a seeming state and an 
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experiential state. Perhaps it is due to the seeming (a more “intellectual” part of the overall 
experience) rather than the sensation that the subject takes the phosphene not to occupy the 
same space as the trees and rocks she’s also perceiving (if we assume that seeming contents 
and experience contents could come apart). Or perhaps, she simply judges the phosphene 
to not be in the same space, despite appearances.  
I conclude that neither imagination experiences, memory experiences nor phosphene 
experiences constitute counterexamples to the spatiality thesis. Given plausible 
assumptions concerning the kinds of spatial phenomenology that memory, imagination, 
and phosphene experiences have, it looks like these experiences are phenomeno-spatially 
connected with perceptual experiences, either through a path via the subject’s point of 
view, or merely in virtue of appearing, phenomenologically to be in the same space as 
perceived objects (and this, in turn, in virtue of its location being comparable to that of 
other objects). Obviously, sophisticated perceivers are aware that the phosphene 
experience does not represent any object in space. This might be in virtue of a judgment 
that the phosphene is not in objective space. But it doesn’t show that the phosphene doesn’t 
appear to be spatially comparable with other objects. 
3.5 Summary 
How does the above relate to the principle that every experience as of an object in space 
is, eo ipso, an experience as of an object at least determinably related to other objects also 
experienced to be in space? Firstly, the correctness of Schwenkler’s interpretation of RM 
would make it the case that the principle doesn’t apply to all object-perception. I hope to 
have laid that worry to rest, however. RM seems to see objects as occupying the same space 
he’s also occupying.  
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Second, how does the principle connect with the ideas advanced here about the 
phenomenology of remembering and imagining? I think that the idea of a path is one (but 
not the only) way in which we may think of two spatially experienced objects being 
experienced as determinably, but not determinately, connected. Imagined, or remembered, 
friend, appears at some location that need not be experienced to be determinately related 
to perceived locations (perhaps this accounts for what some would see as the oddness of 
the question “Where is your imagined elephant located with respect to the desk that we’re 
both seeing?”). But, via the path, the imagined and the perceived get to be experienced as 
determinably related (this is also what accounts for the phenomenal difference between 
perceiving two things as determinably spatially related on the one hand, and experiencing 
an imagined location as connected to the perceived locations; in the first case we don’t 
need to go through any paths).  
That’s what I mean by saying that the subject’s point of view anchors the imagined 
space to the perceived space. If I’m right that this is a species of representing spaces as 
determinably related, then the principle works across all sorts of spatial experiences, not 
only in perception. It is just that the model for connecting whatever’s represented by a 
mental image with whatever’s perceived is more complex than the model connecting, e.g., 
Borgy’s perceptual experiences.  
 
  
Chapter 4: A Case for Spatial Cognitive Phenomenology 
4.1 Do You Experience Your Thoughts as Occurring in Your Head? 
So far, I have established that perceptual representations of space are spatially unified 
with spatial imagination, spatial memory, and other kinds of spatial, non-perceptual 
experiences. Now is the time to show that conscious states taken to lack spatial 
phenomenology, e.g. conscious thoughts and moods, are also, in fact, spatially unified with 
the experiences I have discussed so far. Accordingly, in this chapter I argue for the view 
that conscious thoughts5 exhibit the kind of spatial phenomenology that allows for spatial 
unity with other spatial experiences. More precisely, I claim that whenever we engage in 
the activity of conscious thinking, there is an aspect of the phenomenology of conscious 
thinking that makes it seem to us as if that activity, or its products (i.e. individual thoughts), 
has (or have) some apparent location. Further, the phenomenology in question need not be 
dependent on the content of the thought, but rather, it could be dependent exclusively on 
the kind of propositional attitude (consciously thinking that…) entertained with respect to 
that content.6  
5 By “thoughts” I mean cognitive mental attitudes with propositional content, such as entertaining, 
doubting, hoping, supposing etc. I want to distinguish conscious thoughts, for the purposes of this paper, 
from such mental states as imaginings, rememberings etc.  
6 This claim is not necessary for my position. For it could well be that the phenomenology is due to the 
thought’s content anyway. It is just that the content in virtue of which thoughts have spatial 
phenomenology (e.g. “that this thought is occurring in my head”) is more helpfully thought of as peripheral 
(because usually less important to the thinker) to the central, core content of the thought (e.g. “that 
2+3=5”). 
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Spatial cognitive phenomenology, then, admits of some variety: it is present not only 
when one’s individual thoughts seem to occur somewhere, but also when one’s own 
activity of thinking (i.e. producing a string of thoughts) seems to one to occur somewhere. 
Thoughts also have spatial phenomenology, on my view, when their vehicles exhibit spatial 
phenomenology (e.g. when one “thinks in images” and is conscious of these images’ 
location). 
It’s important to note that my use of the term “vehicle” is closer to that of, e.g., Michael 
Dummett (1994) and Jose Luis Bermudez (2003) than to that of, e.g., Susan Hurley (1998). 
For Hurley, the vehicles of mental states “are usually thought of as neurophysiological or 
computational states or processes located in the brain” (1998). This makes them 
“subpersonal,” that is to say, they are more usefully thought of as states of some subsystem 
within a person (a brain, or some part thereof), and hence they would not figure in folk-
psychological explanations of behavior. Vehicles, on this understanding, are also not 
something we can customarily become aware of.  
The way Dummett and Bermudez use the term “vehicle” appears to differ from the 
Hurley use, although neither Dummett nor Bermudez is particularly explicit about just what 
the “vehicle,” on their understanding, is.  
In Dummett’s work, the term occurs in the context of distinguishing real thoughts from 
proto-thoughts. This distinction is captured partly by appeal to the thoughts’ vehicles:  
A car driver or canoeist may have rapidly to estimate the speed and direction of 
oncoming cars or boats and their probable trajectory, consider what avoiding action 
to take, and so on: it is natural to say that he is engaged in highly concentrated 
thought. But the vehicle of such thoughts is certainly not language: it should be 
said, I think, to consist in visual imagination superimposed on the visually 
perceived scene. It is not just that these thoughts are not in fact framed in words: it 
is that they do not have the structure of verbally expressed thoughts. But they 
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deserve the name of “proto-thoughts” because, while it would be ponderous to 
speak of truth or falsity in application to them, they are intrinsically connected with 
the possibility of their being mistaken. (Dummett, 1994; my italics). 
Bermudez and Dummett distinguish such proto-thoughts (“vehicled” in spatial 
imagery) from thoughts “vehicled” in a public language. Dummett says that, in contrast to 
proto-thoughts that have spatial imagery as their vehicle, language is the vehicle of “full-
fledged thought.” Similarly, Bermudez speaks of propositional thoughts as being vehicled 
by sentences of inner speech, and claims, furthermore, that whenever we’re introspectively 
aware of such thoughts, we’re aware of them as sentences in a public language. He writes: 
“we are not, I think, ever conscious of propositional thoughts that do not have linguistic 
vehicles. When we are conscious of propositional thoughts we are conscious of imaged 
sentences” (Bermudez, 2003). 
In general then, vehicles, on the reading I’m borrowing from Bermudez and Dummett, 
are personal-level states the having of which enables the contents of the subject’s thought 
to become phenomenally conscious (or, in more colorful terms, to bring the thought’s 
content before one’s mind). Visual imagery is one example of such a vehicle (as in 
Dummett’s vignette); auditory imagery is another (when you’re aware of having a thought 
in virtue of engaging in silent speech). I think it is reasonable to ascribe this understanding 
of the term “vehicle” to Bermudez in particular, because of his two claims: one, that our 
introspective awareness of propositional thoughts is always awareness of them as sentences 
in the public language, and two, that public language is a vehicle of propositional thoughts. 
Hence, my use of the term “vehicle” follows established, though not the most common, 
usage.   
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In general, it looks like in some cases the spatial phenomenology of thoughts is more 
like that of pains and other bodily sensations and not that of visual perception, in the 
following respect: pains and other bodily sensations have spatial phenomenology in virtue 
of representing their own apparent location. Perceptions, in general, have spatial 
phenomenology in virtue of representing the location of objects distinct from perceptions 
themselves. Other cases of spatial phenomenology involved in conscious thinking, 
however, might be more difficult to place on the self-location side of this divide. Suppose 
that conscious thinking involves “thinking in images,” and suppose further that thinking in 
images is a quasi-perceptual process in which the images appear perspectivally. To view 
an image perspectivally is to view it from somewhere. Hence, conscious activity of 
thinking in images would have some spatial, or locational, phenomenology, perhaps 
independently of the thought’s content. It might then be held that the quasi-perceptual 
phenomenology of experiencing the vehicle of the thought’s content (e.g. when seeing 
images or hearing sentences in one’s head) endows conscious thought with spatial 
phenomenology. I intend the discussion that follows to cover all these kinds of spatial 
cognitive phenomenology. 
One can distinguish a strong and a weak version of the view that conscious thoughts 
exhibit spatial phenomenology. On the strong reading (what I’ll call the strong cognitive 
spatiality thesis), conscious thoughts always exhibit spatial phenomenology. That is, there 
is no instance of consciously thinking that p that does not make the subject aware of some 
spatial location (independent of the thought’s content). On the weaker reading, some 
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conscious thoughts may be held to have spatial phenomenology while other thoughts don’t. 
I’ll call this the moderate view about spatial phenomenology of thought. My goal is to 
show that the strong cognitive spatiality thesis is more plausible than the moderate view, 
or the wholesale denial of spatial phenomenology to thoughts. 
I admit, however, to having no knockdown argument against the moderate position. 
My aim, therefore, is first to argue that the strong cognitive spatiality thesis is a more 
reasonable starting position than the moderate view. If this is right, then the strong 
cognitive spatiality thesis should be given up only if there are good objections against it. I 
examine several such objections in the course of this paper, and argue that they don’t 
compel us to give up the thesis as a reasonable default position.  
I call the view that postulating spatial cognitive phenomenology is a reasonable default 
position the dialectical advantage thesis. I offer three I offer three reasons for accepting it: 
(1) naïve introspection alone does not allow for the resolution of the debate between the 
strong view and the weak view. Predictably, the proponents of the strong view as well as 
the proponents of the moderate view will hold that introspecting their own experience 
supports their own position. But the moderates seem to occupy a more privileged 
dialectical vantage point here. Their own introspection might serve, after all, as an 
existence proof of conscious thoughts without spatial phenomenology (thus directly 
contradicting the strong cognitive spatiality thesis). I will argue, however, that relying on 
introspection alone, we cannot advance the debate between the proponent and the denier 
of spatial cognitive phenomenology. At most, we’ll reach an impasse. 
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My second reason why the strong thesis is dialectically privileged is that spatial 
cognitive phenomenology goes hand in hand with a broader range of approaches advocated 
in the cognitive phenomenology debate than its denial. The general thrust of the argument 
why the strong view on spatial cognitive phenomenology enjoys a dialectical advantage in 
that context is that it is easier to accommodate with a wider range of positions in the more 
general debate. Cognitive spatial phenomenology goes hand in hand with sensory-based 
views on cognitive phenomenology and does not seem to be inconsistent with views that 
postulate proprietary cognitive phenomenology. It is more difficult to see how a denier of 
spatial phenomenology could accommodate as broad a variety of views in that important 
debate. 
While it is still open to the denier of spatial phenomenology to endorse a view in the 
broader debate that chimes better with his or her denial, the fact that proponents of spatial 
cognitive phenomenology have a broader array of views to ally themselves with seems like 
a reason to assign dialectical advantage to their view, small though it is.   
Lastly, spatial cognitive phenomenology enables us to make clear sense of how to 
describe thought broadcast phenomena (one of the so-called first-rank symptoms of 
schizophrenia). It is hard to see how the deniers of spatial cognitive phenomenology (of 
either moderate or extreme variety) can handle some cases of thought broadcast in a 
principled way. If this is right, then spatial cognitive phenomenology has a clear dialectical 
advantage over its denial.  
I hold that if one accepts (1)—(3), then one ought to adopt the view that conscious 
thoughts always exhibit spatial phenomenology as default, absent compelling objections. 
Therefore, if one intends to hold either the moderate view or if one wants to deny spatial 
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phenomenology to thoughts entirely (the positions aren’t always clearly distinguished), one 
should offer objections against the strong view. Otherwise, one is not entitled simply to 
assert that conscious thoughts lack spatial phenomenology, either sometimes or always. 
4.2 Spatial Phenomenology in Conscious Thought 
Consciously entertaining thoughts is a phenomenally conscious process. If consciously 
entertaining thoughts involves spatial phenomenology, then among the phenomenal 
properties instantiated when the subject is consciously entertaining thoughts, there is some 
phenomenal property the instantiation of which makes the subject phenomenally conscious 
of some location, and, moreover, the experienced location need not depend on the content 
of the thought in question. 
To get clear about the kind of spatiality I have in mind when I talk about spatial 
phenomenology of conscious thoughts, I will consider here two related objections to the 
view that thoughts do have spatial phenomenology. We might call the first the Humean 
objection. The second objection builds upon the Humean one.  Our Humean objector may 
argue as follows: if thought really exhibited spatial phenomenology, then it would make 
sense to speak of sensing one of one’s conscious thoughts to be to the left or right of 
another. But it makes no sense to speak in this way. It’s absurd to think that you could ever 
go through, e.g., a conscious piece of reasoning where the consciously entertained premises 
seem to you to be to the left of your consciously entertained conclusion. And even if it did 
sometimes make sense to think that this could happen, (in some cases of pathological 
spatialization of experience – see Parnas et al. (2005), it seems wildly implausible to 
suppose that our ordinary cognitive phenomenology involves such properties. So, 
conscious thought does not exhibit spatial phenomenology. 
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Another objection along similar Humean lines could be that if thoughts are experienced 
as occurring in the subject’s head, then it should make sense to speak of experiencing one’s 
thought as moving around in the head, or at least as capable of moving around. But it makes 
no sense to speak in this way.7 So, thoughts are not experienced as in the subject’s head. 
Where I think these two objections falter is in assuming that the apparent location of 
conscious thoughts conveyed by spatial cognitive phenomenology is fairly precisely 
specified. On reflection, this approach to spatial phenomenology might be seen as too 
restrictive. We should be more broad-minded about how our inner experiences’ location 
could be specified. My proposal is that we understand location phenomenology of thought 
to admit of being less precise than the kind of spatial experience where such relations as 
“is to the left of” or “is behind” are experienced. In particular, I think it might be worth 
conceiving of some of the spatial properties involved in spatial cognitive phenomenology 
as topological properties.  
In the next section I explain what I mean by topological properties and show how 
appealing to them helps address the two objections. But the general thought is that the 
consciously experienced spatial properties that contribute to what it’s like to have 
conscious thoughts are more coarse-grained than such spatial properties as “being to the 
left” or “being behind.” Rather, the consciously experienced spatial properties could be 
exhausted by, e.g. the topological property of being outside or inside. 
4.2.1 Topological Properties 
The topological property that would be of most interest to us is the property of 
enclosure. To see what the property is, imagine an ordinary triangle. The triangle has a 
7 This objection can be resisted even at an earlier stage. After all, it does make sense to say that thoughts 
are running through my head. 
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number of properties. It has three internal angles, sides of a certain length and so on. One 
of the triangle’s properties is also that it divides the plane into what is inside the triangle 
and what is outside it. Now, topology deals with those properties of figures that remain 
constant under bi-continuous one-one transformation8 (cf. e.g. (Flegg, 1974). The property 
of dividing the plane into an inside and an outside would be preserved under such a 
transformation, and hence counts as a topological property. The size of the angles or the 
length of the sides would not. Why? Intuitively, bi-continuous one-one transformation is 
the transformation that preserves the properties of figures when they are bent, compressed, 
stretched or twisted in any way that ensures that the sides are not “cut” (e.g., a triangle 
could be transformed into, and hence is topologically equivalent to, a circle). What has to 
remain the same, in the kinds of transformations allowed by topology, is that the points 
that are “near” before the transformation remain “near” after the transformation. That is, 
the points in the first figure are mapped onto points in the transformed figure in such a way 
that those that are inside remain inside, and those that are outside remain outside. Given 
that distance is not preserved under transformations allowed by topology, it is more useful 
to think of nearness in terms of remaining inside, or outside, the plane figure. 
The relationships of distance or shape are not preserved under transformations allowed 
by topology. Similarly, the precise location of a point, given by, say, Cartesian coordinates, 
becomes irrelevant when topological properties are concerned. 
8 E.J. Green offers a very helpful explanation of topological properties: “A topological property is any 
property that is preserved under all topological (i.e., one-to-one, continuous) transformations. Topological 
transformations are often called “rubber sheet” transformations, because they include all the deformations 
one can apply to a rubber sheet—e.g., twisting, stretching, bending, etc. However, they do not include 
tearing an object in two, poking holes in an object, “filling in” the holes of an object, or “gluing” pieces of 
the object together. Topological properties include connectedness, an object’s number of holes, and an 
object’s property of being inside or outside another object. Because of the generality of topological 
transformations, any two solid figures—e.g., a ball and a block—are topologically equivalent” (Green, 
forthcoming). 
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Now, I claim that the spatial phenomenology involved in the having of conscious 
thoughts is in some cases more adequately captured when we take it to involve topological 
properties rather than, say, metric properties. So, it might be that (some) inner experiences 
have the spatial phenomenology to the extent that they are felt to occur inside (the subject, 
say) without, at the same time, being felt to occur in a particular location within the subject 
(at a certain distance from the subject’s ears, say). As a result, if topological spatial 
experience is possible, then it’s possible to have a genuinely spatial experience without that 
experience being of something to the left or right, or in front of or behind, something else. 
To the extent that sensing movement requires sensing a change of locations, if in sensing 
one’s conscious thoughts one senses topological properties only, then the only way that 
conscious thoughts could be experienced as moving would be for the thoughts to change 
their seeming location: from being seemingly inside (the subject’s head) to being 
seemingly outside (out in the world), or vice versa. Such experience, of the thought 
seemingly leaving one’s head seems to be what happens in thought broadcast. But such a 
spatial experience would not allow for the sense that one’s thought could move around 
one’s head. Its experienced spatial properties would not allow for such a fine-grained 
differentiation.  
To this it might be objected that it’s really hard to make sense of an experience 
representing topological properties only. Don’t we always have a more detailed awareness 
of the spatial layout of the environment than just that some things are outside other things?  
However, the possibility of topological perception in vision (the pickup of topological 
properties by a human visual system) is a meaningful empirical hypothesis. Some 
psychologists have tried to show that adults visually perceive topological relations (Chen, 
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1982). On the other hand, Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder (1963) famously proposed that 
as children we start out by perceiving topological relations, only later to develop the ability 
to perceive the environment in a somewhat less crude manner. These examples show that 
there’s nothing absurd or incoherent about an experience of merely topological properties. 
I take it as uncontroversial that such an experience would be spatial, in virtue of 
representing spatial properties. 
4.3 Introspective Evidence of Spatial Cognitive Phenomenology 
The next sections are devoted to showing how the three lines of thought identified 
above collectively give dialectical advantage to the view that thoughts always have spatial 
phenomenology. I start with introspection. 
Naïve introspection reveals that when I’m thinking about something consciously, the 
thoughts do seem to occur in my head. That is to say, there is a region of space, enclosed 
by the boundaries of my skull (roughly), where my conscious thinking seems to be coming 
from. That sense is especially vivid when I’m thinking in silent speech: producing a string 
of English sentences which seem to arise in my head, behind my eyes and between my 
ears. The sentences are not audible, but, with a little bit of focus, I could produce them with 
a different “accent” (or does that amount to imagining what I would sound like, were I 
raised in Yorkshire?) or in a different language.9 Beyond that, the thoughts (or, rather, their 
auditory vehicles) don’t seem to have a very precise location, and naturally they don’t seem 
to have any spatial extension. Neither does their location within the head seem to be capable 
9 This phenomenological description does not commit me to any view about the connection between 
thought and language. It is just a description of how certain thoughts manifest themselves to my 
consciousness. But this is a distinct question from the one about the essence of thought in general. It might 
be that the strong connection between language and conscious thought is atypical of the connection 
between language and thought in general. 
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of changing (moving a bit towards the left ear, say). But I experience them to be in my 
head, for all that. 
Obviously, mere introspection doesn’t get us very far. For it is perfectly open to the 
opponents of spatial cognitive phenomenology to appeal to their own introspection and 
deny any phenomenal location properties in at least some conscious thoughts. Which is 
precisely what some philosophers have done (Bayne & Chalmers, 2003; Dainton, 2000; 
Roelofs, 2014; Watzl, 2014). This might be thought sufficient to support the view that some 
thoughts have, and others lack, spatial cognitive phenomenology. Introspective evidence, 
then, favors the moderate view mentioned above. This conclusion would have to rely on 
the assumption that the reports of both sides to the debate are equally good. But the 
assumption is not mandatory. 
One worry to have here is a worry about the reliability of introspection as a source of 
evidence in general. If one were skeptical of introspection in general, the considerations of 
the previous section would be entirely irrelevant to the issue in question. If so, they would 
endow neither side with the dialectical advantage. If introspection is unreliable, then we 
have an impasse. 
Another worry about the conclusion that introspective evidence favors the moderate 
view could be that introspection is simply powerless, on its own, to resolve this dispute (a 
situation analogous to the debate about cognitive phenomenology). While this approach 
does allow introspection to play some role in the debate, it also lets us treat the dialectical 
situation described in the preceding paragraphs as an impasse, rather than a clear victory 
for the moderates. Just as an introspective report of a conscious thought devoid of sensory 
phenomenology does not constitute a knockout argument against the view that conscious 
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thoughts always have sensory phenomenology, an introspective report of a conscious 
thought devoid of any spatial phenomenology doesn’t constitute a knockdown argument 
against my view. 
Lastly, it might be held that if the moderates were right that introspection supports their 
view, this would impose an additional burden on their theory, one that the strong cognitive 
spatiality thesis does not face. The burden is to explain why there’s a phenomenological 
divide between the two kinds of conscious thoughts: those that have, and those that lack, 
spatial cognitive phenomenology. It seems intuitively more plausible to expect the 
phenomenology of thinking to be homogenous (for example, if conscious thinking 
correlates with the activation of the same neural structures, regardless of the content being 
thought, then it seems plausible that the same neural structures being activated would yield 
roughly similar phenomenology; alternatively, assuming that the phenomenological 
properties accrue to conscious thinking not only due to the content being thought, but also 
in virtue of the propositional attitude being consciously entertained, then it seems plausible 
that we will have broad phenomenological similarity among various conscious cognitive 
states). So it might be held that even though introspection favors the denial of the strong 
cognitive spatiality thesis, the moderate view incurs an explanatory debt elsewhere. 
In none of the above cases, then, does it seem that the consideration of introspective 
data provides any of the views concerning spatial cognitive phenomenology with a clear 
advantage. This is why we need to base our arguments on more than introspective data (I 
don’t think we can ever escape introspection entirely when debating such issues; which 
might be problematic if one is skeptical of introspection in general, but these skeptical 
worries would apply equally to proponents and deniers of spatial cognitive 
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phenomenology). The next two sections try to broaden the range of considerations in favor 
of thinking that the strong cognitive spatiality thesis enjoys a dialectical advantage, though 
ultimately they may fail to satisfy a hardline introspection skeptic. 
Thus, in the next section I argue that the debate on cognitive phenomenology makes 
the spatial phenomenology view more appealing than its denial.  
4.4 Cognitive Phenomenology and Spatial Cognitive Phenomenology 
In this section, I propose that spatial phenomenology of thought sits more easily with 
the majority of the positions one can adopt with respect to the cognitive phenomenology 
debate in general. I set aside the view that there’s nothing it is like to undergo thoughts and 
other cognitive states. The cognitive phenomenology debate, as I understand it, is 
concerned with whether conscious thought has phenomenal properties that are distinct from 
phenomenal properties associated with conscious sensory states and conscious bodily 
states. In what follows I adopt Charles Siewert’s characterization of sensory phenomenal 
features as “those features whose possession is found in the activity of various standardly 
recognized perceptual modalities (vision, hearing, etc.) along with bodily feelings of pain 
and pleasure, cold and warmth, and kindred sensations, together with whatever analogs of 
these there might be in imagery” (2011). 
Now, here are the options one can pick with respect to the phenomenal properties of 
conscious thoughts: (a) all cognitive phenomenology is sensory (all phenomenal cognitive 
states have only sensory phenomenal properties, including the phenomenology of 
proprioception: a view endorsed by e.g. Jesse Prinz (2011), Adam Pautz (2013), Peter 
Carruthers and Benedicte Veillete (2011) and Michael Tye and Briggs Wright (2011); (b) 
there is proprietary thought phenomenology but it is always associated with sensory 
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phenomenology (i.e. there are no wholly cognitive phenomenal states, but the cognitive 
states have some extra phenomenology that wholly sensory states lack; Elijah Chudnoff 
(2015) seems to favor this view); (c) some conscious thoughts may have proprietary 
cognitive phenomenology in the absence of any other phenomenology (i.e. there could be 
wholly cognitive phenomenal states; a view endorsed by, e.g., Russell Hurlburt (1997; 
2008) and Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). 
I take it that options (a) and (b) are probably the ones most easily accommodating of 
spatial cognitive phenomenology. Indeed, one may argue that views like these entail that 
cognitive phenomenology has a spatial aspect to it. One argument could go like this: 
(1) All conscious thought involves sensory phenomenology. 
(2) All sensory phenomenology has a spatial aspect to it. 
(3) So, all conscious thought phenomenology has a spatial aspect to it. 
Premise (2) does require some defense. However the kinds of considerations in favor 
of its truth are not hard to find. At first sight, it does seem that when we sense things, we 
sense them to be out there or in here, at least. They are not sensed to be nowhere at all (it 
is hard to understand what this could even mean). It seems to me that less argumentation 
is required to show that (2) is true, than to show that the paradigmatic cases of conscious 
thoughts involving sensory phenomenology (thinking in words of one’s language or 
entertaining mental images) lack a spatial aspect. It is difficult to imagine hearing silent 
speech without any sense whatsoever of where it was originating. Despite prominent views 
to the contrary (see e.g. (Strawson, 1959)), it appears phenomenologically apparent that 
auditory experiences have spatial phenomenology. James Van Cleve (2006), for instance, 
uses a simple appeal to phenomenology to dispute Strawson’s claims, while Casey 
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O’Callaghan (2010) offers a critique of Strawson’s arguments which, to my mind, is 
compelling. Van Cleve says: “Strawson [is] wrong to regard hearing as an aspatial sense. 
I would think [him] wrong on purely phenomenological grounds quite apart from 
physiology” and then explains in a footnote: “I hear the notes of the mockingbird outside 
my study as possessing an intrinsic over thereness. I do not merely associate the melodious 
song of the mockingbird with what I shall see if I look to the left and the raucous call of 
the bluejay with what I shall see if I look to the right.”  
O’Callaghan raises similar worries for Strawson’s view:  
Location information detected by auditory processes is perceptually and 
consciously manifested. It is not merely delivered subconsciously to epistemic 
processes that manage belief formation. Though the mechanisms of auditory 
localization utilize temporal information, such as wave onset delays, and phase 
information, subconscious localization processes result in conscious perceptual 
access to locations. This is the experience of audible direction and distance from 
oneself. Support for this claim goes beyond introspection. Behavioral evidence 
from performance shows clearly that localization is a low-level, automatic 
perceptual process that does not require inference, effort, or extra-auditory 
cognition to “work out”. Turning reactively to a sound behind the head is virtually 
unavoidable… Subjects who report and act upon the audible locations of events in 
egocentric space neither guess nor report beliefs lacking ground in auditory 
experience. It seems we hear where things are and where sounds come from … 
[A]udible qualities seem to have audible locations—a fact demonstrated by 
behavioral and introspective tasks” (2010) 
I admit to being convinced by this. Auditory phenomenology seems to be spatial 
phenomenology. 
It is even more difficult to imagine “seeing” a mental image without it seeming to 
occupy some position in a visual field (intelligible questions could be raised about whether 
mental images are seen to occupy the same space as objects represented in perception; but 
they do seem to occupy some space or other). 
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So, with respect to options (a) and (b) the proponent of spatial phenomenology of 
thought is in a better position than the denier or the moderate. This is because there does 
not seem to be an obvious way of denying some spatial aspect to our sensory and 
proprioceptive phenomenally conscious states. If (a) or (b) are true, then the strong 
cognitive spatiality thesis, being entailed by them, inherits their modal force. Hence, if (a) 
or (b) are true, the moderate position is false (perhaps necessarily so). 
What about option (c) then? Clearly, the worst case scenario for proponents of spatial 
cognitive phenomenology would be if the debate turned out in (c)’s favor. For then it would 
seem obvious that wholly cognitive phenomenal states need not involve spatial 
phenomenology. One could even try to argue that (c) entails that some conscious thoughts 
lack spatial phenomenology. To do it one would have to argue like this: 
(1) Only phenomenally conscious sensory states exhibit spatial phenomenology. 
(2) There could be wholly cognitive phenomenal states. 
(3) A wholly cognitive phenomenal state is not a sensory state. 
(4) So, there could be phenomenal states that lack spatial phenomenology. 
But, fortunately, (1) doesn’t appear to be true: one can feel pride in one’s chest (in the 
spatial sense of “in”), desire in one’s loins and anxiety in one’s stomach. It’s at least not 
obvious that these states have a sensory component, and they seem to have a spatial 
component. 
One can still say that the states mentioned are body-involving, and having to do with 
bodily processes, and that qualifies them as sensory, in contrast to cognitive 
phenomenology. But if one is so permissive with assigning body-involving 
phenomenology to various (not obviously sensory or proprioceptive) conscious states, then 
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it seems to beg the question against the proponent of spatial cognitive phenomenology to 
insist that cognitive phenomenology lacks any spatial aspects. We’d need a principled 
reason to exclude cognitive phenomenology from the class of conscious states that could 
have spatial aspects. But the argument was intended to provide such a principled reason! 
So it seems circular.  
It is, moreover, not obvious why it would be part of the essence of wholly cognitive 
states that they couldn’t be felt by the subject to occur in some part of his body, or inside 
him in general. If it isn’t part of their essence, then spatial cognitive phenomenology is 
compatible with (c). After all, we do have ways of representing spatial properties in a non-
sensory way (think e.g. about representing a sphere by the equation “x2+y2+z2—1=0,” or 
representing multidimensional spaces that seem impossible to visualize and perceive). 
In sum, at least this asymmetry seems to present itself when it comes to the issue of 
spatial cognitive phenomenology in the context of the debate on cognitive phenomenology 
in general. The positions that are most friendly to spatial cognitive phenomenology seem 
to entail it, given some plausible assumptions. The position least friendly to it still seems 
compatible with spatial cognitive phenomenology. On the other hand, it appears that the 
denial of spatial cognitive phenomenology is incompatible with (a) and (b). And (c) does 
not appear to favor the denial of spatial cognitive phenomenology over its opponent (at 
least not to the same degree that (a) and (b) favor spatial cognitive phenomenology over 
the moderate view). 
All in all, then, it seems now that spatial phenomenology of thoughts has a better chance 
of being accommodated by a wider variety of positions within the cognitive 
phenomenology debate than the denial of spatial phenomenology to thoughts. This makes 
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the former view prima facie preferable. Given that introspective data did not give any 
position a clear advantage, the strong cognitive spatiality view seems to be preferable on 
the balance of all evidence so far considered. 
4.5 Thought Broadcast and Spatial Cognitive Phenomenology 
I will now turn to the third way of supporting the strong cognitive spatiality view, based 
on thought broadcast – a pathology of cognitive phenomenology that occurs in some 
schizophrenic patients. I will argue that the most plausible explanation of the schizophrenic 
patients’ phenomenology favors the postulation of spatial cognitive phenomenology over 
its denial. 
4.5.1 Thought Broadcast 
In general, patients suffering from thought broadcast feel that their thoughts escape 
their minds, and may then become available for others to access. I will argue that the 
explanation of the phenomenology of this symptom of schizophrenia favors the postulation 
of spatial cognitive phenomenology over its denial. 
Several related but distinct phenomena have been described as thought broadcast in the 
literature. The name is somewhat misleading (“thought diffusion,” which was originally 
used to describe this phenomenon would perhaps be more apt, but that name is no longer 
current in the literature, so I will stick to the standard label) in that not all clinical definitions 
of thought broadcast require that the thought’s content actually become available (i.e. 
broadcasted) to others. It is these latter cases (thought broadcast, so to speak, without its 
content becoming available to others) that are of particular interest for my purposes. This 
type of thought broadcast is described in the literature in the following ways:  
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Diffusion or broadcasting of thoughts. The patient, during the process of thinking, 
has the experience that his thoughts are not contained within his own mind. The 
thoughts escape from the confines of the self into the external world, where they 
may be experienced by all around. There is usually a secondary delusional 
explanation of this phenomenon which may invoke the use of telepathy, television, 
etc. (Mellor, 1970) 
Thought broadcasting. The patient’s experience that as his thoughts occur they are 
escaping from his head aloud into the external world. (Taylor & Heiser, 1971) 
[T]he subject is quite certain of “negatively” being aware that he has lost HIS OWN 
thoughts, feelings and so on because in some way they passively diffuse into or are 
lost to the outside world against his will (e.g. thought broadcast). (Koehler, 1979) 
[T]hought broadcast … (ii) wide: either thoughts leave the confines of the subject's 
mind but are not shared or they are so loud that others can hear them. (O'Grady, 
1990) 
[In thought broadcast t]he patient experiences his thoughts as escaping silently; they 
may or may not be available to other people. This definition does not stipulate that 
thoughts become audible. They are perceived as escaping silently, with no 
mechanism being specified as to how they escape. (Pawar & Spence, 2003) 
Mellor also offers an actual report of a patient with thought broadcast: “A 21-year-old 
student said: ‘As I think, my thoughts leave my head on a type of mental ticker-tape. 
Everyone around has only to pass the tape through their mind and they know my thoughts.'” 
(1970). 
Thought broadcast, then, involves (at times, at least) the sense that one’s thoughts leave 
one’s head. To account for such cases, we seem to need to appeal to the spatial 
phenomenology of thoughts. The next section explains why.  
4.5.2 Spatial Phenomenology in Thought Broadcast 
What goes wrong in these cases of thought broadcast? What disruption of ordinary 
phenomenology do the above descriptions convey?  
In my view, the best explanation of thought broadcast phenomena involves an appeal 
to spatial phenomenology: what goes wrong in thought broadcast is that the patients feel 
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their thoughts to change their felt spatial location. Most other aspects of having conscious 
thoughts seem to remain the same in broadcasted and regular thoughts (cf. e.g. Bortolotti 
and Broome (2009), Martin and Pacherie (2013). Consider: the patients seem to have good, 
immediate, first-personal access to their thoughts (so immediacy is preserved); the thoughts 
need not be accessed by others (so privacy is preserved); and they seem to be both owned 
and authored by their subjects (so both the sense of ownership and the sense of agency are 
preserved). Suppose this is right. Then, the only thing that’s odd about these thoughts is 
that they seem to occur at some unusual location, i.e. outside the subject’s head! 
So, rather than occurring in the head, as we normally feel our thoughts to occur, the 
thoughts are felt to escape, or leave the subjects’ heads and become lodged, or perhaps 
spread out, outside their bodies. The thought is sensed to have changed its topological 
properties with respect to the subject (or the subject’s head). The thought has ceased to 
occupy one location, and began occupying another location. It is quite natural, I submit, to 
explain thought broadcast in this way. Yet, this natural interpretation of the phenomena is 
not available to the (wholesale) denier of spatial cognitive phenomenology. And it’s only 
available to the proponent of the moderate view if she is willing to accept some extra ad 
hoc hypotheses as well (I will explain more about this later on).  
It might be argued in reply that the pathology involved in thought broadcast consists in 
the spatialization of conscious thoughts rather than a disruption of the normal spatial ‘feel’ 
conscious thoughts have. That is to say, what accounts for thought broadcast is not that the 
patients begin to feel their thoughts to be located outside their heads, rather than inside it 
as they normally do, but rather that they begin to feel them to be located at all. 
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One reason to resist this line of thought is this: if the above is right, then it’s quite 
surprising why the patients go to the trouble of saying that thoughts leave or escape their 
heads, rather than settle for something like: my thoughts are out there, floating about etc. 
The contrast alluded to does not seem to be between lack of spatial properties and presence 
of spatial properties. Rather, it is a contrast between a thought being inside and its being 
outside; it is the unusual felt location that accounts for some cases of thought broadcast, 
not the fact that the thoughts seem to have a location at all (if it were, one would expect the 
patients to remark on this new aspect of their phenomenology; as far as I can tell, they 
don’t). Similarly, there are pathological cases in which patients ascribe spatial properties 
to conscious thoughts that do not seem to be part of ordinary cognitive phenomenology. 
Some patients seem to feel their thoughts to be to the left or right of one another, e.g., or to 
press against a side of their skull—cf. (Parnas et al., 2005). It appears that in such cases it 
is likewise the disruption of the normal spatial feel of the thought that is responsible for the 
reports, and not the sudden acquisition of spatial phenomenology. The reason is the same 
as with thought broadcast. The patients don’t remark on the very existence of felt spatiality 
of the thoughts as odd. Rather, they remark on the disrupted spatiality as odd. 
Additionally, if all cases of thought broadcast involved was the loss of privacy to one’s 
thought, it would be surprising why the patients would persist in using spatial vocabulary 
when describing their symptoms. However, if those cases (referred to in the literature as 
“narrow” thought broadcast) were the only cases of thought broadcast, the denier of spatial 
cognitive phenomenology could say this: what the patients experience is that their 
thoughts’ contents are available to others. Undergoing such an unusual experience requires 
an explanation. The patients explain their experience of their own thoughts’ being available 
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to others by saying that their thoughts leave their own heads. Yet, this need not be seen as 
a description of their phenomenology, but rather as a quasi-theoretical explanation of the 
patient’s seeming to lose exclusive access to their thoughts.  
The above line of thought strikes me as plausible. So it is fortunate that there is some 
reason to believe that “wide” symptoms of thought broadcast really occur. O’Grady and 
Pawar and Spence both present data according to which some schizophrenics (and a small 
number of non-schizophrenics) are reported to exhibit “wide” thought broadcast. 
There are two further worries one could raise at this point. First, the moderate could 
accept that some thoughts (in particular, the thoughts of the thought broadcast subjects) 
involve spatial phenomenology but deny that the results generalize to all instances of 
conscious thinking. Second, one could say that the patients just happen to be ones whose 
thoughts have spatial phenomenology, but there’s no reason to generalize to all subjects of 
conscious thinking. These seem to be ad hoc responses, however. What, exactly, is the 
reason that we should not generalize to all subjects or to all thoughts?
It might nevertheless be granted that generalizing to all conscious thought subjects 
from the few cases of thought broadcast is too hasty. Even so, the burden now is firmly 
shifted onto the moderates and the deniers of spatial phenomenology to provide reasons 
why thought broadcast cases are not illustrative of disruptions to certain aspects of 
everyday cognitive phenomenology. In the absence of such reasons, it seems to me that 
we can adopt the spatial cognitive phenomenology view as default.  
In sum, considerations concerning thought broadcast suggest that spatial cognitive 
phenomenology is a useful explanatory resource, and that the deniers (even those of the 
moderate variety) may face some dialectical disadvantages when trying to explain these 
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phenomena. Additionally, absent a principled reason to believe this, it seems completely 
ad hoc to say that spatial cognitive phenomenology occurs in the pathological cases but 
does not generalize to all cases of cognitive phenomenology.  
4.5.3 A Possible Objection 
To all this the following objection might be raised: Some cultures seem to think that 
the heart is where the soul resides and thinking originates. It is parochial to think that all 
thought phenomenology involves the sense of thought occurring in one’s head. It’s not 
likely that such phenomenology would be avowed by, say, Aristotle or Mencius.  
Suppose it is replied that people feel the thoughts merely to be located inside their 
boundaries, and cultural variation plays a role only when it comes to specifying the more 
exact location of the thought (head, heart etc.). But if the friend of spatial phenomenology 
could allow for cultural variation (presumably in the form of culturally shared beliefs and 
naïve theories) to influence some spatial phenomenology of thought (or descriptions of 
such phenomenology), then what’s stopping a denier from going all the way and attributing 
all spatial talk to culturally influenced quasi-theories about where thinking occurs? This 
objection may be formulated as follows: 
It might be that all this “in the head” talk is just a reflection of a naïve theory about 
where the thinking machinery of human beings is located. Many of us believe that the brain 
is the organ of thought and that this organ is in the head. We shouldn’t read more into the 
speech patterns of schizophrenic patients and ordinary subjects than this. In particular, we 
shouldn’t infer that there is any spatial phenomenology captured by spatial idioms. Rather, 
there is just cognitive phenomenology whose description people embellish with a quasi-
theoretical addition. Hence, people who say things like “there’s a thought in my head” 
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make an inferential step from “I’m conscious of having a thought” via “thinking is caused 
by the brain” and “my brain is in my head” to “there’s a thought in my head.” But only 
“I’m conscious of having a thought” should be read as a phenomenological report. The rest 
is theoretical superstructure.  
I have the following to say in reply: At least some philosophers have endorsed the view 
that their conscious thoughts seem to exhibit spatial phenomenology (e.g. Daniel Dennett 
in “Where Am I?” (1981) says “when I thought “Here I am,” where the thought occurred 
to me was here, outside the vat, where I, Dennett, was standing staring at my brain [first 
italics mine]”). Should we assume that they too are bewitched by the metaphor and the 
naïve theory of where the organ of thought is located in the human body? It is, of course, 
not impossible that they are. But a theory that explains away introspective judgments by 
accusing those avowing them of confusion has to rely on more than mere introspective 
judgment to argue its own case. For one could equally well argue that the non-spatial view 
is an effect of being bewitched by language (or a quasi-theory) that treats minds as 
fundamentally different from bodies.  Our different takes on naïve metaphysics may pull 
our descriptions of cognitive phenomenology in different directions. So what? As things 
stand, the deniers of spatial cognitive phenomenology use appeal to introspection as their 
main strategy. And this, it seems to me, provides them with no dialectical advantage if all 
they can do to discredit the opponents’ view is to explain away their introspective 
descriptions. This is because such explaining away is a double-edged sword, and it cuts 
both parties to the debate in equal measure. 
A subtler explanation of why there is a divergence in introspective reports is in terms 
of cognitive penetration. It might be said that the belief about where the thought originates 
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cognitively penetrates thought phenomenology. That is, the phenomenology of thought is 
causally affected by the belief concerning the thought’s origin in such a way as to yield 
spatial phenomenology: the genuinely felt spatial location of the thought. However, where 
the belief is absent, the phenomenology lacks this spatial element. This explains 
intersubjective variation. 
The extent of cognitive penetration, and its very existence, are subjects of much 
controversy. But even assuming that cognitive penetration is real, it would be too hasty to 
conclude that it provides an explanation in this sort of case. This is because an appeal to 
cognitive penetration would not be in a position to explain the variation of introspective 
reports on cognitive phenomenology within a single subject (and Dainton and Roelofs 
seem open to admitting that while some (or even most) thoughts have spatial 
phenomenology, others lack it; that is, they seem open to the view that both kinds of 
thoughts seem able to occur within a single subject). It would be extremely puzzling to 
maintain that my belief that my thoughts originate in my head should penetrate some, but 
not all, of my cognitive phenomenology.  
As a result, the appeal to the background theory of the location of our thinking 
machinery does not appear to succeed in blunting the force of the considerations advanced 
here. Regardless of whether the objection to the strong cognitive spatiality thesis has it that 
the background theory informs introspective judgments without affecting phenomenology, 
or whether the background theory is supposed to cognitively penetrate the phenomenology 
itself, the objection doesn’t succeed. This is because either we can explain away 
introspective judgments of the proponents of the weaker theses concerning the thoughts’ 
felt spatiality (just as they claim to explain away judgments supporting the strong thesis), 
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or we may doubt the validity of appeal to cognitive penetration as an explanatory tool in 
the case of thought phenomenology. However, if we can explain away introspective 
judgments of the proponents of the weaker thesis concerning thought spatiality, the other 
side is left with nothing else to appeal to. In contrast, the fans of the stronger thesis may 
appeal to considerations from beyond introspection to argue their case. This gives the 
stronger thesis the dialectical advantage. 
4.6 Summary 
I have surveyed three different areas of theorizing about thought phenomenology (naïve 
introspection, the cognitive phenomenology debate, and some deviant cases of thought 
phenomenology) to conclude that it is prima facie more reasonable to adopt spatial 
cognitive phenomenology as a default position. This shifts the dialectical burden onto the 
denier of spatial phenomenology. I have also examined some objections to the spatial 
cognitive phenomenology claim, and tried to show how they fail. Given all that, I think it 
is reasonable at this point to assume that our thoughts involve spatial phenomenology. 
The spatial properties involved in thought phenomenology are of such nature that 
cognitive experiences are spatially unified with other spatial experiences of the subject. 
This is because cognitive phenomenology seems always to involve, at least, localizing the 
thought (thinking activity) either inside or outside the subject, i.e. either within or outside 
the subject’s boundaries. But these boundaries are experienced as spatially related to other 
things sensed and perceived. Hence, the location of a thought is experienced as belonging 
to the same space as the felt locations outside and inside the subject. 
 
  
Chapter 5: What makes up a Mood Experience? 
5.1 Moods and Their Characteristics 
In this chapter I argue that the phenomenal character of a mood experience (that is, 
what it’s like to be in a mood) wholly depends on affective modifications (appropriate for 
the mood in question) to the phenomenal characters of one’s non-mood experiences. I 
argue that this view accounts for all distinctive aspects of mood phenomenology. I also 
point out what consequences this view has for using mood experiences as counterexamples 
to the Intentionalist project of reducing the phenomenal character of experience to its 
intentional content. Lastly, I explain how this account is consistent with the thesis that 
spatial unity is necessary for phenomenal unity. 
I will start by explaining what I mean by mood experiences and what I take to be the 
characteristics of such experiences that every theory of mood experience ought to account 
for. I will also briefly introduce existing theories alongside my own theory of mood 
experience. Then I will explicate my own theory and show how it explains every 
characteristic feature of mood phenomenology. I will end with some remarks on the 
relevance of my view for the debate on Intentionalism in general and the account of the 
unity of consciousness I’m offering in this work. 
Paradigmatic cases of moods include elation, depression, and anxiety. Mood 
experiences are generally agreed to have three characteristic features: (a) mood experiences 
are phenomenologically similar to corresponding emotional experiences (e.g. anxiety is 
similar to fear, and elation to happiness); (b) mood experiences, in contrast to emotions,                    
typically seem to have unspecified objects, or even seem to lack intentional objects 
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altogether (they don’t seem to be about anything); and lastly, (c) they also have far-reaching 
effects on other experiences, and indeed, on our entire psychological life.  
I take it that while (a) and (b) are intuitively understandable, (c) requires additional 
elucidation. John Haugeland expresses this last feature of moods eloquently when he 
writes:  
moods are pervasive and all-encompassing … The change from being cheerful to 
being melancholy is much more thorough and far-reaching than that from having a 
painless foot to having a foot that hurts. Not only does your foot seem different, but 
everything you encounter seems different. The whole world and everything in it, 
past, present, and future, becomes grayer, duller, less livable. Minor irritations and 
failings are more conspicuous and less remediable; ordinary things are no longer 
fun, lovely, or pleasing …  moods not only affect how things look, they affect how 
one thinks. What seems reasonable when you’re cheerful seems foolish when 
you’re melancholy, and vice versa. Likelihoods and improbabilities invert, as do 
what seems relevant to an issue and what seems beside the point (Haugeland, 1978; 
italics mine). 
Since (a)—(c) are commonly agreed to be characteristic features of the phenomenal 
character of moods, in what follows, I will use the term ‘mood experiences’ to refer to 
phenomenally conscious experiences that have these three phenomenal features.  
Below I will argue for the view that the phenomenal character of a mood experience 
wholly depends on what it’s like to undergo other, non-mood experiences modified in a 
certain patterned way and that this explains why moods have the features they do.  
5.1.1 Dimensions of Mood Theories 
In this subsection, I introduce two dimensions along which theories of mood 
experiences may vary. First, theories of mood experience typically take a stand on whether 
mood experiences have intentional content. Thus, we have intentionalist accounts of mood 
phenomenology (Kenny, 1963; Mendelovici, 2014; Price, 2006; Solomon, 1993; Tye, 
1995, 2008) according to which mood experiences have such content, and non-
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intentionalist ones (Russell, 2003; Searle, 1983) according to which mood experiences are 
not about anything. 
Second, theories of moods vary according to whether they take mood experiences to 
have the phenomenology that’s independent from the phenomenal character of other 
experiences, or whether they take mood phenomenology to be so dependent. Let’s clarify 
these notions a little. 
One example of a dependent experience is an experience which attributes properties 
detectable by different senses (sound and color, e.g.) to the same object. Take an 
audiovisual experience as of a moving car. That experience’s phenomenal character (of a 
red oblong car making a loud noise, say) wholly depends on the phenomenal character of 
the visual experience (seeing the car’s color and shape) and the phenomenal character of 
the auditory experience (hearing the sounds the car is making). A dependent experience is 
one whose phenomenal character wholly depends on the phenomenal characters of other 
experiences. That is, it couldn’t occur in the absence of the experiences it is dependent on. 
Let us call any experience that is not dependent, a basic experience. 
I call the views according to which mood experiences are basic, the Ontological 
Independence of Moods views (OIMs), and the views that deny it, the Ontological 
Dependence of Moods views (ODMs). 
In the next section I divide the accounts of mood experiences by how they address the 
issues of: (1) intentionality and (2) ontological independence of mood experiences. 
5.1.2 Classifying Mood Theories 
There are multiple accounts of the phenomenal character of mood experiences. It is 
variously taken to consist in: raw feels (e.g. James Russell); representations of unattached 
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affective properties (e.g. Angela Mendelovici); representations of one’s overall condition 
(e.g. Michael Tye); global representations of the world as a whole (e.g. Robert Solomon, 
Carolyn Price) or of a series of objects (e.g. Anthony Kenny). I will briefly introduce these 
views via the way each addresses the two dimensions mentioned above. 
On Russell’s view, for a subject to undergo a mood experience is for the subject to 
experience a raw feel: a purely qualitative, free-floating conscious sensation that is not 
directed at any object. E.g., when a subject experiences anxiety, she has a mental state 
essentially consisting in some sort of non-representational anxiety quale. The subject just 
feels anxious.  
The phenomenal character of the raw feel experience does not appear to depend on 
other non-mood experiences. It seems possible to experience a raw feel independently of 
any other experiences you’re having. Hence, classifying Russel’s view as OIM appears 
appropriate. 
On Mendelovici’s view a subject is in a mood when she represents an unattached 
affective property. E.g. when a subject experiences anxiety, she has a mental state 
essentially consisting in representing the unattached property of scariness.  
This view is also, I take it, an OIM. This is because the phenomenal character of the 
representation of an unattached property does not seem to depend on other non-mood 
experiences. 
Tye’s one view is that a mood experience essentially consists in having an experience 
representing the overall state of oneself, in something like this way: “[i]f one feels elated, 
one experiences a change in oneself overall. The qualities of which one is directly aware 
in attending to how one feels on such an occasion are experienced as qualities of oneself. 
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One is aware of a general sense of buoyancy, of quickened reactions, of somehow being 
more alive” (2000). If one reads these remarks as saying what a mood experience is, then 
Tye’s view counts as OIM. Being directly aware of my own qualities seems independent 
of any other experiences. 
Another view of Tye’s (advanced in his (1995)) is that mood experiences represent 
departures from the regular range of one’s body’s physical states. In other words, moods 
represent our bodies in a certain way. This representation, again, doesn’t seem to depend 
on any other experience (it might depend on a generalized representation of my body, but 
that representation need not be itself conscious). Both Tye’s views, then, are OIM. 
The main motivation for the non-intentionalist OIM is phenomenological: mood 
experiences don’t seem, from the inside, to be about anything in particular. When you’re 
elated or depressed, there need be nothing about which you feel in this way. That is, mood 
experiences introspectively don’t seem to be intentional states. The main motivation for 
intentionalist OIM (as it is for intentionalist views about moods in general) is theoretical. 
The idea is to save Intentionalism (the theory that phenomenal character reduces to 
intentional content) from the apparent counterexample in the form of a mood experience 
that is phenomenally conscious without being intentional. 
The accounts according to which moods represent the world as a whole can be given 
both an OIM reading and an ODM reading. That is, the mood experience can be a basic 
experience (basic in virtue of having its own independent phenomenology) representing 
the whole world, or the phenomenal character of the representation of the whole world may 
be dependent on what it’s like to consciously represent parts of the world. On the first 
reading, the basic experience could be a single thought with the content “The world as a 
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whole is wonderful” (see e.g. (Tye, 2008)). You may consciously entertain this thought in 
the absence of any other experience. So its phenomenal character doesn’t depend on other 
experiences.  
Alternatively you might think that the representation of the world as a whole is, 
typically, perceptual and hence, typically, multimodal (a version of this view is developed 
by Price). On such a view the phenomenal character of the mood experience would depend 
on representing parts of the world in a certain way. At any rate, the world-as-a-whole 
intentionalist views about mood experiences could be either OIM or ODM.   
Lastly, consider Kenny’s view according to which moods represent a series of objects. 
E.g., the objects of a depressed mood “are the things that seem black.” It also seems that 
this is an ODM view. Your mood experience’s phenomenal character depends on 
experiencing particular objects. These multiple objects, according to Kenny, are the 
intentional objects of a mood experience. The generalized conscious representation that 
constitutes the mood experience (“objects A—N seem black”)) depends on the conscious 
representations of particular obejcts (“A seems black, …, and N seems black”). 
And, finally, this is the view I will argue for: 
The Patterned Modification View (henceforth, PMV): What it’s like for the 
subject to undergo a mood experience wholly depends on what it’s like for the 
subject to have non-mood experiences affectively modified in a certain patterned 
way appropriate for the mood in question. 
My view is obviously an ODM view. A mood experience cannot occur without those 
other experiences obtaining. However, in contrast to the existing accounts I have presented, 
PMV leaves the question of mood intentionality open. It will, I believe, emerge in the 
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course of this discussion that I have a good reason for abstaining here. Put simply, it’s 
because other difficult questions need to be answered before we can say whether mood 
experiences are intentional states or not. 
To articulate and motivate PMV, in Section 5.2 I will say more about modification of 
mental states in general, and the modifications relevant for mood experiences in particular; 
Section 5.3 explains the notion of pattern in more detail, in preparation for the arguments 
of Section 5.4 where I will argue that a mood experience cannot occur in the absence of 
the pattern of modification, and Section 5.5 where I argue that PMV explains all the 
characteristic features of mood phenomenology; Section 5.6 briefly notes the relevance of 
these considerations for that part of the debate on Intentionalism that appeals to moods and 
Section 5.7 relates the considerations of this chapter to the whole project. 
5.2 Modification 
In this section I introduce and explicate the notions of modification, and the close 
connection between mood experiences and modifications of non-mood experiences. I will 
proceed by listing examples of modification of mental states outside the context of a mood, 
and then I will point out some general characteristics of such modifications. After that, I 
will list some examples of modifications by moods. 
5.2.1 Examples of Modification in General 
Suppose you’re reading a detective novel. About halfway through, you begin to suspect 
who the kidnapper is. You believe, with the credence of .6, say, that it’s the bodyguard. As 
you read further and more clues are uncovered, you acquire more and more certainty that 
the bodyguard is, indeed, the kidnapper. Your credence rises to, say, .9. Your belief, then, 
has been modified along the credence parameter. It has been modified by the evidence you 
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acquired. Furthermore, if the belief were conscious, then there would be a phenomenal 
difference between consciously believing with .6 credence that the bodyguard is the 
kidnapper, and consciously believing with .9 credence that the bodyguard is the kidnapper. 
This is our first example of modification. 
Perceptual states may also be candidates for modification. One oft-cited example is that 
hills look steeper when you’re wearing a heavy backpack. Suppose this is right (though 
Chaz Firestone (2013) offers a powerful critique of these sorts of cases). Looking at some 
hill without wearing a backpack, you experience it as steep to degree N. Once you put on 
the backpack, however, when looking at the same hill, in the same viewing conditions, you 
see it at as steep to degree M>N. In such a case we might say that your perceptual 
experience of a hill has been modified along the parameter of perceived slope. 
These are, we might say, single, linear parameter modifications. But often isolating just 
one parameter that gets changed will be difficult to do. Consider phenomenal contrasts 
between an expert and a novice (often appealed to in the debate on high-level properties, 
most famously by Susanna Siegel (2011)), as outlined by Kevin Connolly (2014): “Due to 
practice or experience with properties in their expert domain, experts in some fields 
perceive the world differently from non-experts. Cabernet Sauvignon tastes different to a 
wine connoisseur than to a novice. Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony sounds different to a 
conductor than to an untrained listener. What it is like to see a wren is different for an 
expert birdwatcher than a non-expert.” Tasting Cabernet Sauvignon, at some time t, I 
experience its flavor in just the way a novice would. Then I undergo months of rigorous 
sommelier training. After the training period, at some time t+1, when I taste the same wine, 
in identical tasting conditions, I experience its flavor differently. In such a case we might 
 
99 
 
say that my experience of the wine has been modified along some parameter having to do 
with the flavor (complexity? Variety?). But it’s not easy to specify informatively what 
aspect of the experience it is that has been modified. Intuitively, however, these examples 
belong together with the examples of modification in the belief case and the hill case. So I 
will not treat the difficulty in specifying the parameter along which the phenomenal change 
occurs as indicating some deep divide between cases of modification of an experience. 
Lastly, consider the following case. Suppose that over the course of several months, I 
develop a distinctive liking for Sumatran coffee. Before, its taste was neutral to me. I didn’t 
get any pleasant sensations when drinking it. It felt no different than drinking any other 
coffee, as far as the pleasure it brought me was concerned. But after a while, drinking 
Sumatran coffee started bringing with it not just the usual caffeine rush, but also a 
distinctive pleasure. The coffee began tasting more pleasantly than other varieties. Here, 
the parameter that accounts for the change is the degree of the pleasantness of experience. 
I take the above cases as paradigms of modification. The perceptual ones seem to have 
at least the following in common: take a subject’s experience E1. While keeping the distal 
stimulus, the external conditions, the subject’s sensory apparatus (in general, as much as 
possible) constant, vary the experience along some parameter that yields a change in E1, 
so that there’s a phenomenal difference between the new experience E1’ and the old 
experience E1, and had the subject not been in E1 at t, he would not be in E1’ at t+1, and 
E1 and E1’ score highly on any relevant measure of similarity. On some views, under these 
conditions E1’ would be a modified version of E1. On other views (e.g. if you thought that 
the identity of an experience is wholly determined by its phenomenal character), they 
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would be two distinct experiences. But whatever relation holds between E1 and E1’, I take 
that relation to be crucial to my notion of modification. 
Likewise in the conscious belief case, the intentional object of the experience, the mode 
of accessing that object (i.e. the propositional attitude), even the content of the experience 
(‘that x is the kidnapper’) remain unchanged. And yet, the difference in credences could 
make a phenomenal difference. So, the later conscious thought seems to stand in roughly 
the same relation to the earlier thought as E1’ stands to E1. 
5.2.2 Modifications and Moods 
Moods are often noted, both in psychological and philosophical literature, for the 
effects they exert on the subject’s entire mental life. But the way these effects are specified 
bears a striking similarity to how phenomenal contrasts exemplified above are introduced. 
Below is a sample of quotations displaying this tendency (italics mine). 
[B]eing in a mood seems to involve profound and far-reaching effects on one's 
mental condition. The change from a depressed to a euphoric mood is much more 
profound than the change (say) from hoping that Tom will get the job to fearing 
that Tom will get the job. … The most common metaphors [to describe this feature 
of moods] are from optics. One reads that moods are ‘filters’ which ‘color 
perceptions’. One is told of the ‘rose-colored glasses’ of euphoria and the ‘rosy 
light of happiness’. Furthermore, one is informed that in euphoria and depression 
‘things look rosy or black’. And from Solomon one gathers that certain moods 
‘[cast] happy glows or somber shadows’ on every object of experience. (Lormand, 
1985) 
moods are pervasive and global, having the capability of influencing a broad range 
of thought processes and behavior … they can … subtly insinuate themselves into 
our lives, influencing what we remember of the past, perceive in the present, and 
expect from the future (Morris & Schnurr, 1989). 
When people are in good moods, they are thought to be ‘wearing rose-colored 
glasses,’ tending to notice and interpret events in an overly positive light … When 
in bad moods, however, everything seems hopeless and people tend to notice and 
interpret events negatively (Rusting, 1998).  
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When I enter into a particular mood, for example when I become irritated, I begin 
to see things differently — I begin to see objects in the world as annoying and 
malign (Fish, 2005). 
As [a subject] walks along outside, she encounters an ever-changing landscape of 
sights, sounds, and smells. Today, given her mood, the storefront across the way 
doesn’t seem nearly as shabby as it usually does; the face of her taciturn neighbor 
doesn’t strike her as quite as menacing; the car horns fail to disturb her and likewise 
for the odors emanating from the overflowing dumpster at the curb. Today, 
everything she passes seems wonderful and new (Kind, 2014).  
Taking at face value the phenomenological reports articulated above, it appears that 
mood experiences do indeed involve the kinds of modification that the previous subsection 
talked about. When you’re in a mood, the phenomenal character of your non-mood 
experiences (perceptions, bodily sensations etc.) is changed in a specific way. There is a 
clear phenomenal difference between how things strike us when we’re elated (as 
wonderful, say) and how they strike us when we’re depressed (as bleak and hopeless, say). 
Our experiences get modified, perhaps along such parameters as valence (seeing things in 
a positive vs. negative light) and arousal, and maybe some others, in such a way as to yield 
a phenomenal difference even though the moody and the non-moody experiences are as 
similar as possible in all other respects.  
The above quotations can, as a first pass, be all said to express, in their various ways, 
the following thesis: 
MANIFESTATION: Mood experiences manifest themselves in consciousness via 
modifications to the phenomenal characters of non-mood experiences. 
I assume that MANIFESTATION is true. Moreover, since its truth is widely 
acknowledged, it should be accounted for by any theory of mood experience. 
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5.2.3 Beyond Modifications 
More needs to be said about mood experiences than what MANIFESTATION says. 
Most importantly, it’s not just one or two phenomenal states that need to be modified for 
you to have a mood-experience; rather, a significant number of phenomenal states needs 
to be modified to make it reasonable to speak of a person as experiencing a mood. This is 
made clear by the observation that moods have a ‘global,’ or ‘pervasive’ character. They 
affect all (or, more plausibly, a significant chunk of) your mental states (look back again 
at some of the descriptions cited above: when in a mood, a lot seems different to you). It 
would be very strange to say that you’re in a mood when only a small proportion of your 
experiences is affectively modified (you’re not really anxious when only one thing in the 
world seems scary to you). We might say that the mood experiences’ global character is 
realized at the phenomenal level via the mechanism specified by MANIFESTATION. 
So, when you’re having a mood experience, many of your mental states are modified 
in a certain way. It is, however, implausible to say that it has to be all of your mental states 
that are somehow individually modified by the mood for you to have a mood experience. 
For suppose you’re depressed. Everything in the world seems awful and pointless. And 
then you feel an itch (or a random thought occurs to you). Such an itch (or thought) could 
be affectively neutral. But it’s implausible to say that you have thereby snapped out of your 
depression as soon as you felt it. This seems to suggest that while mood experiences are 
indeed global—that is, they involve many of the subject’s mental states—they don’t have 
to be total; that is, they don’t have to involve all of the subject’s mental states. 
Lastly, we must note that not just any global modifications of experiences’ phenomenal 
characters will do to count as a mood experience. There has to be some coherence to how 
your experiences are modified. For instance, if your neighbor seems more terrifying to you, 
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the dinner tastes more wonderfully than usual and the TV show appears boring and dull, 
you’re not in any recognizable mood. Your affect is all over the place. On the other hand, 
if all those things seem dull, or wonderful, or menacing, then you are in a mood. So, not 
only do most of your mental states need to be modified for you to count as having a mood 
experience. In addition, the modifications need to exhibit a certain orderly arrangement. 
As Michael Tye (2008) remarks, describing what it’s like to feel elated, “as my experience 
of elation continues, its object changes. But even though there is no single object, each object 
is represented in the same way – as wonderful.” We may therefore conclude that 
modifications of your non-mood experiences need to conform to some pattern for you to 
undergo a mood experience. Below I present one way in which we could think more 
precisely about such patterns. It should be noted, however, that I intend what follows 
merely as a heuristic tool geared towards helping to understand moods in the way I see 
them. The slightly more formal treatment of the notion of a pattern that I present merely 
puts some of the characteristics of patterns in sharper relief than an intuitive understanding 
appealed to so far. However, I take it that these characteristics are already part of our 
intuitive concept of the pattern. Thinking mathematically about them simply brings out 
these characteristics more clearly. 
5.3 Patterns of Modification 
To understand what a pattern is (mathematically speaking) we have to start with the 
mathematical definition of randomness: “A series of numbers is random if the smallest 
algorithm capable of specifying it to a computer has about the same number of bits of 
information as the series itself” (Chaitin, 1975). If a series is not random, then the 
information about it can be compressed. In the remainder of this paper, I follow Daniel 
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Dennett (1991) and interpret the definition as a bi-conditional. Hence, if a series can be 
compressed, it is not random, i.e. it’s patterned. For example, consider the series 
010101010101. You can give the computer the instruction to print the series by instructing 
it to print ‘01’ six times. That information is compressed; it contains fewer bits than the 
original. On the other hand, consider the series 18656773652090. There is (I think) no 
shorter way of giving printing instructions to the computer other than specifying the whole 
sequence verbatim. 
Loosely applied to mood experiences, the idea is this: when you want to describe to a 
computer (or someone else) how different phenomenal states of a person (call him Bert) 
having a mood experience are modified, you can simply identify each of Bert’s conscious 
states, and then identify the way in which that state’s phenomenal properties are affectively 
modified. That is, you can tell the computer that Bert’s experience is such that “The whole 
world and everything in it, past, present, and future, becomes grayer, duller, less livable. 
Minor irritations and failings are more conspicuous and less remediable; ordinary things 
are no longer fun, lovely, or pleasing.” This is just a non-compressed list of the 
modifications to various experiences of the world that Bert is undergoing. But you don’t 
have to specify all the modified phenomenal properties of Bert’s every mental state to let 
someone else know what Bert’s experience feels like. You can simply tell them that Bert 
is experiencing a melancholy mood.10 Thus, when a subject is undergoing a mood 
experience, the way his experiences’ phenomenal characters change can be specified 
without listing all the experiences and all the modifications. This is why, in saying that 
10 This, obviously, is an idealization, but it seems to point in the right direction. 
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someone is having a mood experience, we capture a certain pattern of affective experiential 
modifications.  
So, when you’re having a mood experience, a significant portion of your conscious 
states is modified in that your conscious experiences change in a patterned way. Now’s the 
time to show that a mood experience depends on such a patterned modification and that 
this fully explains mood phenomenology.  
5.4 Mood Experiences Depend on Patterned Modifications 
I will argue here that no mood experience can occur without a patterned modification 
of non-mood experiences. Before that, I will show that the OIM positions are mistaken if 
they take the basic experiences to be sufficient for a mood experience. It will then turn out 
that considerations exactly similar to those that show the insufficiency of a basic experience 
can be harnessed to show the moods’ dependence on patterned modifications. 
Case 1: Basic experiences are not sufficient for a mood experience.  
Suppose that all you need for a mood experience is some basic experience (a 
raw feel, or a representation of an unattached property, or a thought that everything 
is awesome). That is, once you have the appropriate basic experience, you’re 
undergoing the corresponding mood-experience. If this is right, then, whatever your 
other mental states feel like, as long as you have, say, a melancholia raw feel, you’re 
experiencing melancholia. However, this entails that it’s possible for you to have a 
melancholy mood experience while all, or the majority of, your mental states are 
modified in a way typical of elation. So, it could be that you are in a melancholy 
mood while everything seems new and wonderful to you (and, moreover, nothing 
seems sad or cheerless!). This is counterintuitive and prima facie inconsistent with 
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the moods experiences’ global character. But it seems to follow from the view that 
all you need to have a mood experience is to have the appropriate basic experience. 
Hence, I conclude that just having a basic experience of some sort is not sufficient 
for a mood experience. 
This doesn’t yet entail the dependence thesis. It is possible that something other than 
the patterned modification accounts for a mood experience. But considerations analogous 
to those of Case 1 can be harnessed to show that a mood experience cannot occur in the 
absence of the patterned modification of other experiences. 
Case 2: A mood experience cannot occur in the absence of the patterned modification. 
Suppose now that a mood experience can obtain in the absence of a patterned 
modification. If this is right, then you might be experiencing melancholia (maybe 
you’re having a melancholia raw-feel; or you’re representing an unattached 
affective property sadness) while none of your non-mood experiences are affected 
in any way. However, this entails that it’s possible for you to have a melancholy 
mood experience while nothing seems sad and pointless to you. This is 
counterintuitive and prima facie inconsistent with the moods’ global character. But 
it seems to follow from the view that you don’t need a patterned modification of 
your mental states to undergo a mood experience. Hence, I conclude that a mood 
experience cannot occur in the absence of a patterned modification of other 
experiences. 
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The same conclusion can be reached in a different way, as follows: 
Case 3: A mood experience cannot occur in the absence of a patterned modification. 
Suppose your experiences are just as they normally are, and yet you feel 
depressed. So, you could say: ‘nothing seems more bleak and hopeless today than 
on any other day, but I somehow feel depressed.’ It follows that you could well feel 
depressed on one day, and elated on another, without any change to how things 
seem to you. So, you could say ‘none of my (non-mood) experiences are in any 
way different today when compared to yesterday, but I now feel elated, and 
yesterday I felt depressed.’ This is counterintuitive and prima facie inconsistent 
with the moods’ global character. I doubt that we can make sense of such a radical 
change in moods without a slightest change in how things seem to the subject. So, 
this gives us yet another reason to think that a mood experience cannot occur in the 
absence of a patterned modification of other experiences.  
To the extent that the quotations from the previous section articulate an intuitive 
understanding of what a mood experience is like, the strangeness of Cases 1—3 gives us a 
good reason to believe that a mood experience depends on a patterned modification of other 
mood experiences, and that having a basic experience on its own (i.e. without the 
modifications) is not sufficient. 
Moreover, I think that PMV by itself explains mood phenomenology better than any 
alternative view so far presented. So we don’t need basic experiences at all.  
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5.5 Explaining Mood Phenomenology 
In this section, I argue that PMV can account for all the distinctive features of mood 
phenomenology, while the competing views all face at least one hurdle. This will show that 
all we need to account for mood phenomenology is a patterned modification. Hence, 
nothing else is required. 
5.5.1 Characteristic Features of Moods 
The characteristic features of a mood experience are as follows: mood experiences are 
(1) global, (2) seemingly non-intentional and (3) phenomenologically similar to emotions.  
• I have explained globality above in more detail but it is important to recall the 
caveat that globality does not have to be total. You can have a mood experience 
even when many but not all of your mental states are affected.  
• Non-intentionality of moods is usually expressed by the idea that moods don’t 
typically seem to be about anything in particular. Introspectively, it’s often hard to 
specify what you’re depressed or elated about. 
• Similarity between moods and emotions is usually illustrated by examples: being 
anxious, and fearing the wolf; being elated, and being happy that the Eagles won; 
being depressed and being sad that the Eagles lost. All these pairs of experiences 
seem to share important experiential aspects. They’re phenomenally similar in 
some relevant way.  
There are two more characteristics, however, that I’d like to add.  
• Sometimes moods are introspectively obvious, other times they are introspectively 
opaque. Sometimes, you know you’re in a lousy mood. Other times, other people 
have to point out your mood to you for you to notice it. Let’s call this characteristic 
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the moods’ (4) epistemic duality. (4) has not gone unnoticed among mood theorists 
(see e.g. Paul Griffiths (1989)),  but it’s not mentioned nearly as often as (1)—(3).  
• Lastly, it seems that it would be good for any theory of mood experience to explain 
why MANIFESTATION is true or at least gesture at an alternative mechanism of 
how the moods’ global character occurs at the level of consciousness.  
Below is a schematic list of mood characteristics, and an indication of where each of 
the views here considered might have trouble accounting for it (if anywhere). I will first 
discuss how PMV accounts for all these aspects. Then I will point out some of the 
shortcomings of its competitors. 
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Table 5.1 A summary of how various views account for central aspects of mood phenomenology 
View Accounts for: 
 Globality Apparent Non-
intentionality 
Similarity 
to 
Emotion 
MANIFESTATION Epistemic 
Duality 
Mood 
Represents 
Bodily State 
No  No  Depends 
on 
Theory of 
Emotion 
No No 
Mood 
Represents 
World as 
Whole 
No Yes11 Yes Yes No 
Mood 
Represents 
Series of 
Objects 
No No  Yes Yes No 
Mood 
Represents 
Unattached 
Affective 
Property 
No  Yes Yes No No 
Mood 
Represents 
One’s 
Overall 
State 
No  Yes Yes No No 
Mood is a 
Raw Feel 
No  Yes Yes No No 
PMV Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
 
11 This is debatable: both Mendelovici and Kind appeal to phenomenology to deny plausibility to 
intentionalist views of this sort. They both hold that, in Mendelovici’s words “Some cases of anxiety really 
don’t seem to be plausibly directed at anything at all. One just feels anxious. Similarly, some cases of 
sudden elation really don’t seem to be directed at the world as a whole, an unspecified object, or anything 
else. One just feels elated. Insisting that these experiences are in fact directed at unusual objects simply gets 
their phenomenology wrong” (2014). One way to reply to this objection would be simply to deny the 
phenomenological datum. But a less radical solution is available, at least for ‘whole-world’ intentionalism. 
It might be held that to represent something is, perhaps typically or paradigmatically, to discriminate it 
from the background. But when you represent the world as a whole, it doesn’t seem to you that you 
discriminate anything in particular from the background. Yet, it needn’t follow that you don’t represent 
anything at all. Representing without discriminating is atypical of representation in general, but not 
incoherent (imagine seeing a uniformly colored wall right in front of your eyes). 
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5.5.2 PMV Explains Everything about Mood Phenomenology 
I start with globality. Globality, recall, refers to the mood experiences’ having wide-
reaching effects on other experiences, as well as on the subject’s entire psychological life. 
At the same time, it is not necessary that all of the mood subject’s conscious states be 
somehow affected by the mood. PMV has resources to account for the moods’ global 
character in a non ad-hoc way. This is because a series’ being patterned seems to imply at 
least some globality without implying totality (a pattern can survive some random noise: 
the series 010100101010101 is still a patterned series).  
To see this, let us look at two examples of numerical series: the first one is 
0110117485769348766480921. The second is 01101101101101101148576934876. The 
first, I take it, is not patterned, even though there’s a non-random bit there in the beginning. 
This is because specifying the pattern to the computer (print 011 twice, and then print 
748…) would not substantially reduce the amount of information you have to provide the 
computer with to transmit the series. Things are different with the second series. Here, the 
opportunity for the compression of the data is bigger. You may instruct the computer to 
print ‘011’ six times, and then specify verbatim the remaining sequence. You would 
substantially compress the information in this way. The compressing algorithm would be 
useful. But this seems to be because there is a substantial amount of data in the series that 
can be compressed, and not just a small orderly bit somewhere. In general, it does seem 
that for us to talk about a patterned series (or whatever), it has to be usefully compressible, 
and for it to be usefully compressible, the compression must be available for a substantial 
proportion of the bits comprising the series. Hence, patterns have a global character. 
Now, you might think that the use of imprecise terms like ‘substantially’ should be 
avoided in what’s claimed to be a formal treatment of patterns. But the mathematical 
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definition of the pattern that I’m using likewise involves some imprecise wording (“about 
the same”). Similarly, other philosophical explications of the mathematical view of 
randomness (cf. (Eagle, 2014)) appeal to such informal considerations when determining 
whether there is a pattern. Ultimately, it looks like talk of “significantly longer output 
strings” and “usefulness” (cf. ibid.) is extremely helpful even in more formal settings. It 
doesn’t seem to me that this amount of vagueness in the application of the terms “pattern” 
(and, if my view is right, “mood”) should trouble us. “Mood” is a common sense concept, 
so it is to be expected that cases will arise where pragmatic considerations will turn out to 
be the final arbiter as to the term’s applicability. 
So it appears that PMV can give a theoretically motivated account of a mood 
experience’s global character. While it could ultimately be a matter of practical expediency 
which algorithms are useful, it appears intuitively right to say that a substantial part of a 
series has to be compressible for us to judge an algorithm to be useful, and hence, a series 
to be patterned. Similarly, a substantial portion of one’s experiences has to be modified for 
us to judge a person as having a mood experience. The globality of moods is a special case 
of the globality of patterned series in general. 
When it comes to explaining mood experiences’ apparent lack of intentional objects, 
PMV can do the job as well. The reason to think so is that patterned series in general do 
not appear to have intentional objects. Consider a series of numbers, like [1, 3, 6, 10]. 
Obviously, each numeral refers to a number. But it’s not so clear that the whole series is 
about numbers as well (which numbers? The ones in the series? But the algorithm 
specifying the pattern allows us to continue the series indefinitely. Is the series about those 
numbers that would come after 10 were the series to be expanded, too?). Similarly, consider 
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Dennett’s use of barcodes as prime examples of patterns. It’s not immediately obvious 
what, if anything, these barcodes are about. 
Now you may think that since its bits are intentional states, the patterned series of 
affective modifications also has intentional objects: the objects of the particular states. But 
this doesn’t follow. Even though a mood experience consists in a pattern of mental states 
that do have intentional objects, a patterned series doesn’t need to inherit all the properties 
of its elements. Furthermore, the intentional content of its bits appears irrelevant, on the 
face of it, to whether there is a pattern of affective modification. Suppose I see a car, a cat, 
and a caterpillar, while thinking about China, and experience all of them as scary. It’s not 
their intentional contents that make it the case that these states exhibit a pattern. It’s their 
affective modifications. 
To this it might be replied that affective modifications themselves are (or could be) 
intentional (maybe they’re about affective properties things are represented as having). 
Hence, the patterned series itself is about these affective properties. Again, I think this 
argument fails. To see this, consider the following list of words: wicket, goal, striker, 
match, possession, tactics, midfield, touchdown.12 This series of words exhibits a pattern: 
aside from the first and last one, all the words are connected with soccer. The series exhibits 
the pattern in virtue of the intentional properties of the words. But the series itself (six 
soccer words flanked by two non-soccer words) is not about soccer, or anything else in any 
12 Worries might arise as to whether an algorithmic description of this series can be given; that is, whether 
there can be patterns “at the intentional level,” as Dennett (1991) puts it, that conform to the mathematical 
definition. If there cannot, however, I reiterate my proposal to think of the algorithmic understanding of 
patterns merely as brining out more clearly the characteristics of patterns and patterned series that our 
intuitive grasp of these notions already attributes to them (i.e. globality and apparent non-intentionality). 
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clear or obvious sense. By this I mean that it’s hard to decide, on the face of it, whether its 
object is the game of soccer as a whole, the things its elements refer to, or nothing at all. 
The intentionality of most moods is not transparent to introspection. It is usually not 
obvious, from the inside, whether moods are about anything or not; it is, indeed, a puzzling 
question on the face of it. The same puzzlement arises when we ask about intentional 
properties of patterned series in general (it’s true even in the apparently easiest cases, like 
the soccer pattern above). Thus, the lack of an obvious intentional object of a mood looks 
like a special case of a patterned series lacking an obvious intentional object even when its 
elements all have intentional properties and when the series is patterned in virtue of these 
intentional properties. 
It is worth noting, too, that some moods have fairly clear objects: being irritable, for 
instance, simply means that things and events you encounter irritate you. Similarly, some 
patterns clearly are about the items the pattern’s elements refer to. Consider, for instance, 
a shopping list (arranged corresponding to where in the supermarket each item is: first the 
dairy products, then fruits and vegetables, then soft drinks). It seems clear that, in this case, 
the list is about the items its elements are about. But just as moods are typically seemingly 
non-intentional, so the example of a shopping list could be considered atypical of patterned 
series. 
PMV can also account for the phenomenological similarity between emotions and 
moods. Mood phenomenology depends on there being a pattern of affective modifications 
appropriate for the mood in question. The best way to cash out appropriateness is in terms 
of phenomenological similarity, roughly as follows: for an affective modification of an 
experience to be appropriate for the mood in question, it needs to exhibit phenomenological 
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similarity to the emotional experience corresponding to the mood. Otherwise we couldn’t 
speak of that particular mood experience at all. 
To see this more clearly, consider the case of Luke, afraid of the squirrel he sees in 
front of him. Luke’s experience is phenomenally different from just seeing the squirrel 
without fearing it. In contrast to his neutral experience, Luke’s experience of the squirrel 
as threatening involves some sort of modification by an affective component. Suppose now 
that the encounter with the squirrel has put Luke in an anxious mood. That is, on the view 
I’m proposing, his overall experience can now be characterized by many of his non-mood 
experiences’ being modified in the way appropriate for anxiety. That is, in a way that is 
roughly similar to how his experience of the squirrel that caused the anxiety13 was modified 
(plausibly, unless the anxiety is overwhelming, the modifications composing the mood are 
less pronounced than the corresponding modification that is part of the emotional 
experience14). Hence, there is a phenomenological similarity between the phenomenal 
character of Luke’s emotional experience of the squirrel and the phenomenal character of 
his anxiety, because the affective components of an emotional experience and the affective 
modifications that compose the mood experience are phenomenologically similar. 
The next characteristic of mood experiences I consider is their epistemic duality. 
Sometimes, we can easily tell that we’re in a mood. Other times, it doesn’t occur to us that 
we are in a mood until some external observer points it out (or we reflect back on our past 
experiences). PMV has resources to account for this: some patterns are easy to spot, and 
13 Causal relations obtaining between emotions and moods is an artifact of the example, and by no means 
essential to my point. 
14 I am not committing myself here to any theory of emotional experience. I’m merely committing myself 
to the claim that fearing the snake in virtue of seeing it as scary is phenomenally different than just seeing 
the snake. 
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others aren’t (see, e.g., (Dennett, 1991) again, and (Checkosky & Whitlock, 1973)). 
Epistemic duality of moods is a special case of the epistemic duality of patterns in general.  
Lastly, PMV explains the truth of MANIFESTATION. Mood experiences necessarily 
involve modifications of non-mood experiences because they are wholly dependent on 
these modifications. 
In total, PMV explains all the characteristic features of the mood experiences in a 
theoretically satisfying way, either by appealing to features that patterned series have, or 
by appealing to features that affective modifications have.  
5.5.3 Mood Phenomenology and the Competitors to PMVs 
In this section I argue that each of the competitors to PMV faces hurdles that my view 
does not in accounting for the characteristic features of moods. I will only here justify the 
negative entries in the table above. I will assume without argument that the positive entries 
about the competing views are correct. 
It appears that each competitor view fares worse than PMV because of their common 
failure to account for the moods’ epistemic duality. There is nothing about the raw feels in 
general, or about the representational states in general, that renders some of them easily 
noticeable and others hard to notice. We must therefore treat it as a brute fact that some 
mood experiences are, and others aren’t easily accessible by introspection. This is in 
marked contrast to PMV. I have mentioned, however, that epistemic ambiguity is not a 
universally agreed-upon characteristic of moods. I will bracket it then in what follows. 
I will start with the views that mood experience represents one’s overall state or some 
state of one’s bodily equilibrium. The problem for these views is that if it’s the subject’s 
overall state that gets represented in a mood experience, then you have to have a specific 
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theory of emotion to explain the phenomenological similarity between the two without any 
ad hoc devices. In particular, your theory of emotional experience must postulate an 
essential connection between such an experience and the bodily experiences that Tye’s 
brief description lists (alternatively, it must postulate an essential connection between your 
experience of emotion and your assessment of your overall state). This already indicates 
that the view is in a worse position than the remaining ones to account for mood 
phenomenology, because others are not committed to any particular account of the 
phenomenology of emotions.  
Additionally, on the one hand, while postulating an essential connection between 
bodily experience and emotional experience is an attractive position, the bodily-
representation view of moods makes it hard to see why mood experiences would be global; 
it’s not clear what it is about my representing my body that should influence my other 
perceptions, thoughts and feelings. Conscious states of awareness of our bodies don’t 
generally do that. Right now, I’m aware of myself as sitting on a chair, with my legs 
uncrossed. This doesn’t have some global influence on my perceptions, or thoughts. On 
the other hand, while it could be that a representation of one’s overall state is in some way 
pervasive, its similarity to emotional experiences is harder to argue for (why would 
emotional experiences involve an assessment of one’s overall state, exactly?). 
In Error! Reference source not found. I have indicated that whole-world and series-
of-objects versions of representationalism cannot account for the mood experiences’ 
globality. Initially, this seems odd. After all, when you represent everything in one 
representational state, you get the global character of that state more or less ‘for free.’ A 
state that represents everything is, perhaps by definition, global. The worry here, however, 
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is that such a global character is also total. The mood experience, on these views, would 
encompass everything that the subject represents. But, as I have argued before, globality 
should not be taken to entail that all of your conscious states contribute to the mood 
phenomenology. They seem to, however, on these intentionalist accounts. The way mood 
experiences manifest themselves in consciousness must, on these views, involve all of the 
subject’s non-mood experiences. Having this implausible consequence is a disadvantage 
of whole-world and series-of-objects Intentionalism. 
On the other hand, if proponents of these views were to claim that only a portion of 
phenomenal states needs be affected for the subject to be in a mood, there would be no 
theoretical justification for this relaxation of the conditions for the occurrence of a mood 
experience. The relaxation would have to remain unexplained. This is an explanatory debt 
on the part of these theories, one that PMV doesn’t incur. 
When it comes to Mendelovici’s account of moods as representing unattached affective 
properties the problem also arises for its ability to explain the globality of moods. Just 
because a property you’re experiencing is not experienced as a property of some particular 
thing, it doesn’t follow it would pervade your entire experience. This is because, in general, 
experiencing an unattached property does not seem to confer globality on the experience. 
Consider other putative examples of experiencing an unattached property: “color 
experience in a ganzfeld, motion experience in peripheral vision, or experiences had in 
situations where binding failures are prone to happen [as is the case in patients with Balint’s 
syndrome]” (Lee, 2014), or experiences of unbound motion that Type-2 blindsight patients 
report (cf. (Weiskrantz, 2002). I’m not going to pass judgment on whether these really are 
unbound features (and neither does Lee). However, it is not clear that experiencing any of 
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these potentially unattached properties automatically exerts global effects on other 
experiences the subject is also having (even the ganzfeld experience, despite its name, need 
not have any effects on my thoughts and feelings, or on what I’m hearing or tasting, for 
that matter). So, the mere fact that a property is represented as unattached does not make 
the representation a good candidate for globality.  
The raw feel view faces roughly the same difficulty that plagues Mendelovici’s 
account; it is at a loss when it comes to accounting for a mood experience’s globality. 
While moods’ globality is sometimes explained in terms of their non-intentionality (see, 
e.g., Siemer (2009) and Frijda (1994): moods, so the thought goes, seem global because 
they are not confined to being about some single intentional object), this explanation is 
inadequate.  
This is because globality does not seem like a general characteristic of putatively non-
intentional states. Think about an experience of a phosphene. Arguably, such an experience 
doesn’t have an object. But no one would want to say that it thereby acquires some global 
influence on your consciousness and behavior, on “the world and everything in it.” And if, 
as some philosophers think, pains, itches and tickles are not intentional, they still do not 
seem thereby to exert some global influence on your experiences. So a conscious state’s 
lacking an intentional object does not explain that state’s having some sort of global 
influence on experience.  
It appears then that none of the competing views is able to account for all the features 
of mood experiences in a principled way. This makes them inferior to PMV.  
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5.5.4 Amy Kind’s Challenge 
Amy Kind (2014) has recently offered a challenge to Intentionalism about moods that 
might also put pressure on PMV. According to Kind, these four claims are perfectly 
coherent: 
[1] My depression hasn’t worsened since yesterday, but today everything seems 
blacker. 
[2] My fearfulness hasn’t lessened any, but the world seems less scary today. 
[3] The world doesn’t seem any more worrying today, yet somehow my anxiety has 
intensified. 
[4] The world doesn’t seem any blacker today, yet I find myself sinking deeper into 
depression (2014)  
The coherence of the above sentences is meant to show that we could vary intentional 
content of mood experiences without a change in the phenomenal character of the 
experience and vice versa. Even though Intentionalism is Kind’s main target, PMV should 
also be able to meet this challenge. This is because PMV also postulates a tight connection 
between a mood experience and how things seem to the mood subject.  
One way to meet Kind’s challenge is to explain the coherence of [1]-[4] by claiming 
that the first conjunct in [1] and [2] and the second conjunct in [3] and [4] are not based 
exclusively on the subject’s phenomenology; rather, they’re judgments about the subject’s 
overall state based on more than what the world seems like to him. For example, suppose 
a super-neuroscientist looks at my brain and assures me that the neural correlates of my 
mood have not changed any of their physical parameters since yesterday. Being a 
thoroughgoing materialist, I acquire a justified belief that my depression hasn’t worsened 
since yesterday, even though my phenomenology changed. So I may say [1] perfectly 
coherently without thereby impugning Intentionalism. In general, the judgments about my 
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own mood state can be based on phenomenally unconscious background beliefs about me 
(in addition to what my experience feels like), or indeed about the evidential status of my 
phenomenology as it pertains to my overall state. 
Another way to respond to Kind’s challenge is to say that the coherence of [1]-[4] 
comes from the fact that the second conjunct in [1] and [2], and the first conjunct in [3] and 
[4] is only a partial description of a subject’s mood phenomenology (perhaps “everything” 
could be read as “everything I perceive”). Perhaps everything seems blacker, but I’m no 
longer entertaining so many sad memories as I did yesterday. Perhaps the world doesn’t 
seem any blacker today, but thoughts about death and suffering just occur more frequently 
to me. This, I take it, would account for the coherence of [1]-[4] without endangering 
Intentionalism about moods. 
Kind could retort that in proposing these two ways of accounting for the coherence of 
[1]-[4] I have not taken the reports “at face value.” But I think that, when taken at face 
value (i.e., I assume, as being exclusively concerned with the subject’s phenomenology: 
“My experience of depression has not changed, but the world seems blacker today”), the 
four reports do seem extremely puzzling. Having heard one of those, I think it would be 
reasonable to ask the speaker for clarification. Some plausible clarifications are offered 
above. 
At any rate, to the extent that Kind’s challenge is a problem for Intentionalism, it is 
also a problem for PMV. Hence, the replies I have offered can serve to dispel the worries 
Kind’ challenge raises for my view as well.  
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5.6 Mood Experiences and Representationalism 
Part of the philosophical interest in mood experiences is due to their being an apparent 
counterexample to Intentionalism. If I’m right, however, then mood experiences do not 
provide much insight into that issue. That’s because mood experiences, in my view, cannot 
be cited as straight-up counterexamples to Intentionalism nor as straight-up refutations of 
anti-intentionalist concerns. This is because we need to decide both on (a) how 
modification works (is the modification itself intentional, like a seeming; or is it non-
intentional, like an adverbial modification?) and (b) which properties of the elements get 
inherited by the patterned series, in order to be able to decide whether mood-experiences 
really are a problem for Intentionalism. Appealing to mood phenomenology in that debate 
without considering these issues first is to put the cart before the horse. That’s because 
mood phenomenology is compatible with all these options (indeed, as I have mentioned in 
a footnote above, the apparent non-intentionality of moods is also compatible with some 
explicitly intentionalist accounts). 
5.7 Mood Experiences and Spatial Unity of Consciousness 
In this section, I argue that this account of mood experiences is compatible with the 
account of phenomenal unity of consciousness in terms of spatial unity. Elizabeth 
Schechter (2013) distinguishes two kinds of the unity of consciousness: coherence unity 
and phenomenal unity. Phenomenal unity (also called “co-consciousness”) is characterized 
as follows: “for two experiences to be co-conscious with each other is simply for there to 
be something it is like for their subject to undergo both of those experiences 
simultaneously—something that is different from what it is like to undergo the first 
experience one day and then the second the next, for instance, or something that is different 
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from what it is like for Joan to undergo the first experience while, simultaneously, John 
undergoes the second.”  
Coherence unity, on the other hand, obtains when there is integration between contents 
of the subject’s states. According to Schechter, “[a] subject with a coherence unified 
consciousness possesses, first of all, conscious experiences that make sense together, by 
presenting a unified world, a world that makes sense.” It’s worth noting that Schechter’s 
understanding of coherence is more demanding than the one I presented in the Introduction. 
In fact, it’s more akin to Shoemaker’s representational unity.  
There is another kind of unity that, I think, deserves to be called “phenomenal.” Think, 
for a moment, about experiences in a weak-intentionalist fashion. On such a view, 
experiences are composed of the representational content and its mode of presentation. 
However, the way in which the content and the mode of presentation are connected to yield 
a single experience is not the same as the way in which John’s gustatory experience and 
his auditory experience are parts of some bigger experience that John is enjoying. 
Similarly, think about Murat Aydede’s (forthcoming) idea that some experiences are 
modified by an affective quality. This view would also have it that the modified experience 
consists of the content and the way in which that content is presented. This kind of unity, 
between the “what” and the “how” of an experience is definitely different than the kind of 
unity that obtains between John’s two experiences. It is not my purpose to say in virtue of 
what this happens. I’m pointing out to there being such an “intra-experiential” unity, in 
addition to the kinds of unity normally discussed under the heading of the unity of 
consciousness.  
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Now, it seems plausible that an account of phenomenal unity would not be, primarily, 
an account of intra-experiential unity. The way in which the mode of presentation and the 
content of an experience are unified is not the way in which two distinct experiences are 
unified. The basic point is that experiences are in some way free-standing entities, ones 
that can, but don’t have to, stand in phenomenal unity relations to others. Modifications 
are ontologically dependent entities. Even those who think that unified consciousness 
consists in just one experience, and those who think that an experience’s phenomenal 
character depends on what other experiences it is unified with, should, I think, be able to 
make sense of this distinction. They should have in their theory a place for the distinction 
between what I here call “intra-experiential” and “inter-experiential” unity, even though, 
of course, these labels would not be, strictly speaking, appropriate to use for them. 
Because of what I have mentioned above, the following line of criticism of my view of 
phenomenal unity cannot get off the ground: “your account says that spatial unity is 
necessary for phenomenal unity; but a modification of an experience is unified with what 
it modifies without there being any spatial unity relation obtaining between them. Hence, 
spatial unity is not necessary for phenomenal unity.” It cannot get off the ground because 
it equivocates between two senses of phenomenal unity: the inter-experiential unity and 
the intra-experiential unity. We should not expect a single account to capture both kinds of 
unity. And neither do those authors who advance theories of unity. The account that is 
given is the account of inter-experiential phenomenal unity, not an account of intra-
experiential unity.  
Because of this, the idea that moods wholly depend on patterns of modifications of 
experiences is compatible with thinking that spatial unity is necessary for (inter-
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experiential) phenomenal unity. Such modifications are not free-standing experiences for 
which the question of unity arises. This is because the unity relation is a relation between 
experiences, not between non-detachable aspects of a single, free-standing experience. 
Hence, for the mood experience to obtain, other experiences must be simply be modified 
in certain ways. The kind of connection between an experience and its modification is not 
the connection that unity of consciousness theorists seem interested in. On the other hand, 
the experiences that collectively give rise to the mood experience are spatially unified. 
Hence, mood experiences do not pose a special problem for my account. 
Even supposing that the modifications can best be accounted for in terms of seemings, 
it looks like seemings too are not self-standing parts of an experience. You can’t have a 
conscious perceptual seeming without a perception. So seemings too exhibit a sort of intra-
experiential unity with their corresponding perceptions. 
This shows that my account of the phenomenal character of moods in terms of 
modifications to non-mood experiences is still compatible with the spatial unity thesis. 
5.8 Summary 
In this chapter I have argued that a patterned modification of phenomenal characters of 
a subject’s mental states explains everything we need to explain about mood 
phenomenology. Then I argued that while apparent non-intentionality of moods is 
compatible with a variety of accounts (including intentionalist ones), the competing views 
I have considered cannot explain the special features of mood experiences without 
employing some ad hoc devices. I noted the relevance of this paper for the appropriateness 
of the continued use of mood experiences as counterexamples to Intentionalism. Lastly, I 
explained the compatibility of this account of moods with the spatiality thesis. 
 
  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
In this dissertation I have defended the view that unity of consciousness requires unity 
of conscious spatial representation. There are two principal reasons to doubt the necessity 
claim: first, some phenomenally conscious states might not be spatial at all. Examples 
include moods and conscious thoughts. Second, it appears that there could be spatial 
experiences that are both phenomenally unified and spatially disunified. My approach has 
been to develop my theory with a view to laying both these types of objection to rest. 
I have done so by first proposing the thesis that our perceptual representation of space 
is always a representation of a single, unified space. I then used the thesis to defend the 
necessity of spatial unity against objections from Bayne, Dainton, Tye, Roelofs, and Watzl; 
the objections are to the effect that two phenomenally unified spatial experiences can fail 
to be spatially unified. This work was done in Chapter 2.  
In Chapter 3 I have first extended spatial unity to non-perceptual spatial experiences: 
imagining, recollecting, and enjoying afterimages and phosphenes. In the second part of 
this chapter, I have also considered and rejected the position that some perceptual 
experiences of objects are not experiences as of objects in space. Together, Chapters 2 and 
3 show that spatial unity obtains across all experiences standardly taken to have spatial 
phenomenology. 
In Chapter 4 I have argued that phenomenally conscious thoughts should be assumed 
to have spatial phenomenology in the absence of strong arguments to the contrary. I have 
outlined reasons why accepting spatial cognitive phenomenology should be a default 
position; then I have looked at some objections to granting spatial phenomenology to 
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thoughts, and found them all wanting. Lastly, I have indicated how the space represented 
when having thoughts is represented as related to the space we perceive. 
In Chapter 5 I have taken on another case of a phenomenally conscious state (mood) 
that might be held to lack spatial phenomenology. I have argued that mood phenomenology 
is nothing over and above the phenomenology of other experiences suitably modified in a 
patterned way. From this it follows that mood phenomenology, in virtue of being wholly 
derived, does not present an additional challenge to my overall thesis. Mood 
phenomenology depends on phenomenally conscious perceptual, cognitive and somatic 
states; since these states have spatial phenomenology, and since they exhibit spatial unity, 
mood phenomenology cannot obtain in the absence of spatial unity. 
I take the above chapters to establish, then, that (1) all experiences are spatial 
experiences or wholly depend for their phenomenology on spatial experiences, and (2) that 
all spatial experiences represent the same space. From this, it follows that there cannot be 
any two phenomenally unified experiences that are not spatially unified. Spatial unity is 
necessary for phenomenal unity. 
I have thus vindicated a naively appealing view of phenomenal unity. I have done so 
in terms of representations whose neuro-functional profiles are relatively well-understood. 
I have preserved the idea that unified consciousness has something to do with a picture of 
a unified world, without overintellectualizing the resources required to build up that 
picture. The view I’m proposing also explains why unified consciousness frequently has 
perspectival structure, while allowing for the possibility that such perspectival structure is 
not necessary for unified consciousness (because it’s not necessary for conscious spatial 
representation). Lastly, I have also outlined a novel theory of mood experiences, one that 
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allows us to see more clearly what role moods play (and should play) in the debate over 
Intentionalism. 
My dissertation provides a first step in an account of the structure of consciousness. I 
envisage my next step to consist in investigating further the spatial structure that 
consciousness necessarily displays, both in its ordinary form as well as in its disruptions. 
In particular, I want to explore further the nature of perspectival representation; there is 
some temptation to think of unified consciousness as what constitutes our conscious 
perspective on the world. There is also some temptation to think of spatial representation 
as essentially perspectival. And work is being done in both philosophy and neuroscience 
to explain consciousness in terms of perspectival (egocentric) representations. 
Unfortunately, these attempts seem to run into problems if my view is right: conscious 
spatial unity does not seem to demand perspectivalness. But since conscious spatial unity 
is not essentially perspectival, and since it underlies the structure of unified consciousness, 
it appears that we should not attempt to explain consciousness in terms of perspectival 
representation; neither should we seek to locate the perspectival character of unified 
consciousness in spatial unity alone. Two different lines of thought suggest themselves 
here: either the understanding of unified consciousness as necessarily having a perspectival 
structure, a structure with a center and a periphery, is a matter of some additional aspect of 
our phenomenology (attention perhaps); or, alternatively, unified consciousness doesn’t 
have to have a perspectival structure; that it typically does exhibit perspectival character, 
on the other hand, may well be due to its having a spatial structure that is also frequently a 
matter of perspectival representation. This is certainly an interesting project to inquire into. 
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Another area into which the considerations of this dissertation lead concerns the 
prospects and viability of providing a full structural account of the unity of consciousness; 
that is, providing necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness to be unified. We 
may wonder, in particular: is anything else necessary for a unified consciousness? What is 
sufficient for consciousness to be unified? My primary aim in this area of investigation will 
be to show that an account of sufficient conditions for unified consciousness is either 
impossible or trivial. Hence, those who seek to provide a structural account of 
consciousness should focus on necessary conditions for unified consciousness. 
While my view is inconsistent with other views on the unity of consciousness insofar 
as those other views deny the necessity of spatial unity, it is not completely at odds with 
them. And so, my view simply grants consciousness more structure than Bayne’s 
mereological view, Tye’s one-experience view, and Dainton’s view of co-consciousness 
as a primitive relation. On my view, consciousness has a more uniform structure than on 
Masrour’s Leibnizian view. Intriguing prospects arise for connecting the view I defend 
with Watzl’s position according to which the structure of consciousness is given by an 
attentional field, as well as similar ideas present in Roelofs’s and Chudnoff’s work. I think 
it is also worth exploring what my view has to offer to Shoemaker’s conception of the unity 
of consciousness. 
Lastly, an important consequence of the view I’m proposing is the severance of the link 
between spatial awareness and awareness of objectivity. To the extent that spatial 
awareness displays a certain degree of uniformity across different kinds of experiences 
(e.g. experiences of objects, images, phosphenes, pains, thoughts, and the like), that is, to 
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the extent that these experiences display spatial unity, then representing something as in 
space cannot by itself constitute representing it as a denizen of mind-independent reality. 
The results I report here, then, seem to have some application both to theorizing about 
the unity of consciousness, and for broader issues in philosophy of mind that do not directly 
connect with such theorizing. I think this is quite interesting and the opportunities for 
expanding this project’s scope are plentiful. 
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